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Self-(in)security is an aspect of self-evaluation defined as the acceptance (or rejection) of 
one’s own weaknesses. My dissertation consists of three studies investigating self-insecurity as a 
potential transdiagnostic risk factor for psychopathology, especially internalizing 
psychopathology. Study 1 explored the link between self-insecurity and unpleasant repetitive 
thinking, an transdiagnostic process that appears to cause and perpetuate internalizing 
psychopathology. Specifically, I examined the link between-individuals (in a sample of 158 
undergraduates) and within-individual (using daily diaries). Self-insecurity is significantly 
associated with repetitive thinking at both levels—above and beyond self-esteem and 
neuroticism/negative affect.  
Study 2 further investigated self-insecurity’s link with repetitive thinking by using 
longitudinal methods, and began to investigate self-insecurity as a potential risk factor for 
depression. A sample of 195 undergraduates, over-selected for depression history and depressive 
symptom severity, completed two laboratory sessions separated by approximately one month. 
Self-insecurity prospectively predicts increases in repetitive thinking. Additionally, self-
insecurity is associated with lifetime MDD—above and beyond concurrent depression, and 
neuroticism or self-esteem. Moreover, self-insecurity prospectively predicts increases in MDD 
symptom severity, NA, and anhedonic depression. In contrast, depression does not prospectively 
predict changes in self-insecurity. 
In a sample of 280 undergraduates, Study 3 replicated Study 1’s finding that self-
insecurity is associated with repetitive thinking at both the between-individuals level and the 
within-individual level. Moreover, Study 3 began to investigate proposed mediators of self-




relevance of threats, the perceived cost of threats, and discomfort with ambiguity each mediates 
self-insecurity’s link with repetitive thinking at both the between-individuals and the within-
individual levels. Additionally, Study 3 replicated Study 2’s finding that self-insecurity is 
associated with anhedonic depression. Study 3 also began to investigate self-insecurity’s 
associations with subjective experience of stress and several alcohol variables. Although self-
insecurity is not associated with whether participants drank or how much they drank (in standard 
drinks), self-insecurity is associated with the severity of alcohol problems—above and beyond 
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Across time and cultures, psychologists, philosophers, and poets advocate accepting 
one’s weaknesses. Across diverse languages, people commonly use the words “secure/insecure” 
to describe how comfortable/bothered they feel about weaknesses. In psychotherapy, acceptance- 
and mindfulness-based approaches called for accepting—not “fixing”—the things that make us 
feel flawed (e.g., Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Yet, scant research has 
tested—or garnered empirical evidence supporting—the claim that accepting weaknesses is 
beneficial. My dissertation focuses on an aspect of self-evaluation I proposed called self-
(in)security. Self-(in)security is defined as the continuum ranging from comfortably accepting 
versus utterly rejecting one’s own weaknesses. 
In my initial examination of self-(in)security (Huang & Berenbaum, 2017), I 
distinguished it from well-known aspects of self-evaluation, such as self-esteem and self-
compassion. Whereas self-esteem addresses how one feels about one’s global self (e.g., 
Rosenberg, 1965), self-(in)security addresses how one feels about one’s specific weaknesses. For 
example, one could have positive global self-evaluation but be rejecting of weaknesses. Whereas 
self-compassion (Neff, 2003) encompasses ways one responds to emotional pain (actively 
directing love toward oneself, subscribing to the worldview that suffering is universal, and 
regulating painful feelings through mindfulness), self-(in)security focuses on one’s attitudes 
about weaknesses. One could conceivably be self-secure without practicing self-compassion. 
To assess self-(in)security, I developed a self-report questionnaire called the Security of 




reliability, and exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses supported my theory that self-
(in)security is a unidimensional construct. I found that self-(in)security was associated with 
(in)secure attachment style and a wide array of maladaptive interpersonal traits related to self-
evaluation (e.g., pathological narcissism, fear of negative evaluation). Perhaps the most 
important finding was self-(in)security’s association with relationship quality reported by not 
only participants themselves, but also their family, long-term friends, and romantic partners—
even after accounting for self-esteem, self-compassion, and several other aspects of self-
evaluation. 
My dissertation consists of three studies investigating self-insecurity as a potential 
transdiagnostic risk factor for psychopathology, especially internalizing psychopathology. 
Extensive research suggests that maladaptive self-evaluation, such as low self-esteem, contribute 
to psychopathology (e.g., Sowislo & Orth, 2013). However, scant research has explored the 
question: what, exactly, do people evaluate themselves negatively about? I conjecture that if we 
probe every individual who experience some degree of maladaptive self-evaluation, they will 
pinpoint certain things about themselves—personal weaknesses—as the source of their 
maladaptive self-evaluation. I argue that the devil is in the detail: to understand maladaptive self-
evaluation, we will acquire more information by zooming in on people’s attitudes and beliefs 
about their specific weaknesses than, for example, examining their global self-view. I believe 
that, sometimes, we can learn more about the forest by taking samples from a few trees than by 
taking an aerial photograph of the forest. Because weaknesses are unpleasant parts of oneself, I 
theorized that they should be a ready source of emotional distress and difficulties related to self-




emotional distress and exacerbate maladaptive self-evaluation, ultimately damaging mental 
health. 
A major part of my dissertation focuses on self-insecurity’s link with unpleasant 
repetitive thinking. Unpleasant repetitive thinking means engaging in negatively-valenced 
streams of thoughts that are often hard to control (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 
2003; Ehring & Watkins, 2008). It is a transdiagnostic construct that appears to cause and 
perpetuate a wide variety of internalizing psychopathology (e.g., Ehring & Watkins, 2008; 
McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013). I theorized that self-insecurity increases one’s 
threat perception—which, in turn, increases repetitive thinking (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 
2004; Berenbaum, 2010). In Study 1, I examined whether self-insecurity was associated with 
repetitive thinking. Notably, I examined this association at both the between-individuals and the 
within-individual levels, and accounted for self-esteem or neuroticism/trait negative affect. I 
sought to replicate the association at the between-individuals level in Study 2, and then again, at 
both the between-individuals and the within-individual levels, in Study 3. In Study 2, I also 
investigated whether self-insecurity would prospectively predict increases in repetitive thinking 
over one month. In Study 3, I began to seek to elucidate the precise mechanism by which self-
insecurity may contribute to repetitive thinking by testing, at both the between-individuals and 
within-individual levels, three mediators I proposed: the perceived cost of threats, the perceived 
self-evaluation relevance of threats, and discomfort with ambiguity. 
My dissertation also investigates self-insecurity’s link with depression, a common form 
of psychopathology (e.g., Kessler et al., 2003) that creates not only severe impairment and 
distress for individuals, but also a grave burden on societies globally (e.g., Kessler et al., 2009; 




theorize that rejecting them potentiates a variety of cognitive vulnerability factors that predispose 
people to depression, such as negative self-schemas (Beck, 1967) and internal attributional style 
(the tendency to attribute the causes of unpleasant life events to negative self-characteristics; 
Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). In Study 2, I investigated whether self-insecurity was 
associated with lifetime Major Depressive Disorder (MDD)—assessed using semi-structured 
diagnostic interviews—above and beyond concurrent depression, and neuroticism or self-esteem. 
I also investigated whether self-insecurity would prospectively predict, over one month, 
increases in MDD symptom severity, NA, and anhedonic depression. To render less plausible the 
alternative explanation that a link found between self-insecurity and depression could be 
explained by depression’s contribution to self-insecurity, I tested whether depression would 
prospectively predict changes in self-insecurity. In Study 3, I sought to replicate self-insecurity’s 
association with anhedonic depression above and beyond neuroticism or self-esteem. 
My dissertation also began to explore self-insecurity’s links to variables beyond 
internalizing psychopathology. Specifically, in Study 3, I began to explore self-insecurity’s link 
to externalizing psychopathology via alcohol variables. I also began to examine the role of 
subjective experience of stress in self-insecurity’s association with psychopathological 







Study 1: Rejecting One’s Own Weaknesses and Dwelling on the Bad: 
Self-(In)Security Is Associated With Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking 
 
Everyone has weaknesses, things about themselves that make them feel vulnerable or 
flawed (e.g., unflattering personal characteristics, painful past experiences). Perhaps not by 
coincidence, the words “secure” and “insecure” across diverse languages (e.g., English, Spanish, 
Chinese) describe the varying degrees to which people feel comfortable with, versus bothered 
by, their weaknesses. Moreover, philosophers, poets, and psychologists across cultures and time 
have called for accepting weaknesses (for examples, see Huang & Berenbaum, 2017), and 
acceptance- and mindfulness-based psychotherapies have advocated being open and 
nonjudgmental about everything unpleasant (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 2009), including—but not limited 
to—the self. Only one study (Huang & Berenbaum, 2017), however, has examined how people 
relate specifically to their personal weaknesses, and garnered empirical evidence that accepting 
weaknesses is beneficial. 
Huang and Berenbaum (2017) proposed “self-(in)security,” an aspect of self-evaluation 
conceptualized as a continuum ranging from being absolutely self-secure (fully accepting one’s 
own weaknesses) to being absolutely self-insecure (utterly rejecting them). They distinguished 
self-(in)security from well-known aspects of self-evaluation such as self-esteem and self-
compassion. Whereas self-esteem addresses how one feels about one’s global self (e.g., 
Rosenberg, 1965), self-(in)security addresses how one feels about one’s specific weaknesses. For 
example, one could have positive global self-evaluation but be rejecting of weaknesses. Whereas 





directing love toward oneself, subscribing to the worldview that suffering is universal, and 
regulating painful feelings through mindfulness), self-(in)security focuses on one’s attitudes 
about weaknesses. One could, conceivably be self-secure without practicing self-compassion.  
Huang and Berenbaum (2017) began to validate self-security as a beneficial and distinct 
aspect of self-evaluation: self-security was substantially associated—but not redundant—with 
important aspects of self-evaluation (e.g., self-compassion, self-esteem). Moreover, acceptance 
of weaknesses was positively associated (but not redundant) with secure attachment style, and 
negatively associated with multiple maladaptive interpersonal traits relevant to self-evaluation 
(e.g., fear of negative evaluation). Perhaps the most impressive finding was self-security’s 
association with relationship quality reported by not only participants themselves, but also their 
family, long-term friends, and romantic partners—even after accounting for self-esteem, self-
compassion
1
, and several other aspects of self-evaluation. These findings highlight self-security 
as a healthy aspect of self-evaluation linked with important outcomes above and beyond other 
aspects of self-evaluation. 
We posit that self-(in)security holds major implications for emotional wellbeing. Because 
weaknesses are unpleasant parts of oneself, they should be a ready source of emotional distress 
and difficulties related to self-evaluation. Rejecting one’s weaknesses, then, should add fuel to 
the fire: we theorize that it aggravates emotional distress and exacerbates maladaptive self-
evaluation, ultimately damaging mental health. In the present study, we began exploring self-
insecurity’s link with a transdiagnostic construct that appears to cause and perpetuate various 
internalizing psychopathology (Ehring & Watkins, 2008): unpleasant repetitive thinking. Also 
                                                 
1
 The results did not change when the Self-Compassion Scale total score was replaced by any of the subscale scores 





called perseverative/persistent negative thinking, it means engaging in negatively-valenced 
streams of thoughts that are often hard to control. 
Research on unpleasant repetitive thinking has typically focused on rumination and 
worry. Rumination entails past personal losses and failures (Papageorgiou, 2006; Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999), and is often studied in the context of depression (for a review, see Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Worry deals with uncertainty about future 
undesirable outcomes (Berenbaum, 2010; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983), and 
is often studied alongside anxiety (e.g., Barlow, 2004). Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, and 
Shortridge (2003) proposed, however, that rumination and worry are more similar than different: 
these two constructs are better conceptualized not as fundamentally disparate phenomena, but 
rather, as variants of the core process of repetitive thinking. Echoing this theoretical stance, 
Ehring and Watkins (2008) concluded from their extensive review of empirical evidence that 
rumination and worry are the same process applied to disorder-specific content. Supporting this 
idea is McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, and Nathan’s finding (2013) that levels of repetitive thinking 
did not differ across diagnostic groups (e.g., major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety 
disorder, social anxiety disorder), suggesting that repetitive thinking is a common risk factor for 
a wide range of internalizing disorders—and may even explain the high comorbidity between 
depression and anxiety. 
  Whereas maladaptive self-evaluation’s contribution to internalizing psychopathology has 
been well documented (e.g., Sowislo & Orth, 2013), its contribution to repetitive thinking seems 
less clear. For example, low self-esteem is only moderately associated with repetitive thinking 
(Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). We suspect it is 





new approach. Because the perception of threats (broadly defined as all perceived or anticipated 
undesirable outcomes) initiates repetitive thinking (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; 
Berenbaum, 2010), we deduce that an aspect of self-evaluation that would better inform us about 
repetitive thinking must address one’s ways with threats, or capture one’s “modus operandi” 
confronting things that make one feel vulnerable. Hence, we propose self-insecurity as a key to 
elucidating self-evaluation’s contribution to repetitive thinking. Specifically, we theorize that it 
intensifies one’s experience of threats, in three ways.  
First, rejecting weaknesses—seeing them as negatives—should render them powerful 
threats to self-evaluation. Because weaknesses are parts of our being, the more one demonizes 
them, the more one would experience enemies from within. To use a metaphor: if the self is the 
vehicle by which one navigates the world, then seeing one’s weaknesses as acute threats to self-
evaluation is tantamount to sailing the ocean trapped on a ship riddled with holes. Naturally, 
uneasy thoughts about leaks and dangers (e.g., seawater damaging supplies, the ship sinking) 
would preoccupy one’s mind. Feeling self-insecure equals feeling that one’s very self harbors 
threats: one’s weaknesses are fodder for repetitive thinking. We hypothesize that self-insecurity 
leads to increased repetitive thinking about one’s weaknesses. 
Second, feeling unsafe in one’s self should make one susceptible to self-evaluation 
threats beyond weaknesses. Just as leaks in the metaphorical ship compel the seafarer to watch 
out for other threats, we theorize that failing to accept one’s weaknesses puts one on the 
defensive against, for example, rejection by others. Indeed, self-insecurity is associated with 
hypervigilance about others' negative evaluation (Huang & Berenbaum, 2017). The more self-





hypothesize that self-insecurity leads to increased repetitive thinking about self-evaluation 
threats beyond weaknesses. 
Third, difficulty accepting one’s weaknesses should breed difficulty accepting all kinds 
of threats—even beyond self-evaluation. For the seafarer struggling to keep the leaking ship 
afloat, even an ordinary rainstorm endangers survival. Likewise, because feeling self-insecure 
presumably entails fending against myriad self-evaluation threats, we expect that one would feel 
compromised and that further threats would appear particularly costly. Research suggests that the 
perceived cost of threats drives repetitive thinking (Rapee & Abbott, 2007; Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). Moreover, the 
costlier the threat, the harder it is to accept the threat—and such acceptance may be essential for 
terminating repetitive thinking (Berenbaum, 2010). We hypothesize that self-insecurity leads to 
increased perceived cost of threats, which in turn leads to increased repetitive thinking. 
In sum, we theorize that rejecting one’s weaknesses expands the scope of threats one 
experiences and raises their intensity. Our theory is consistent with self-insecurity’s strong 
association with neuroticism (Huang & Berenbaum, 2017), a major personality trait strongly 
associated with repetitive thinking (Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer 2005) and 
internalizing psychopathology (e.g., Griffith et al., 2010). In the present study, we examined 
whether self-insecurity was associated with repetitive thinking at two levels: (a) between-
individuals (do more self-insecure individuals think repetitively more than others?); and (b) 
within-individual (does one think repetitively more on more self-insecure days?). Finding the 
association at either (a) or (b) would be consistent with our theory; finding it at both (a) and (b) 





We tested two hypotheses about self-insecurity and repetitive thinking. Our first 
hypothesis was that they would be associated with each other—at both the between-individuals 
and the within-individual levels. Our second hypothesis dealt with the content of repetitive 
thinking. Based on our theory, we hypothesized that self-insecurity would be especially tied to 
repetitive thinking about self-evaluation (e.g., about weaknesses, about other threats to self-
evaluation). Therefore, we examined the content of repetitive thinking in daily diaries, and tested 
whether it moderated self-insecurity’s association with the level of repetitive thinking. 
Specifically, we expected to find the association no matter whether such thinking revolved 
around self-evaluation, and that the association would be stronger when such thinking does 
revolve around self-evaluation.  
When testing our hypotheses, we accounted for self-esteem and neuroticism/negative 
affect (NA) to examine how much the strength of self-insecurity’s association with repetitive 





 Participants were 158 undergraduates (69.3% female), ranging in age from 18 to 22 (M = 
19.4, SD = 1.2). Racially, the majority (60.8%) identified as White, followed by 16.3% Asian, 
11.1% Black/African American, and 8.5% other or multiracial; ethnically, 11.8% identified as 
Latino/Hispanic. Participants provided written informed consent and received credit toward 






 Participants completed trait assessments individually, and received instructions to 
complete at least six (and preferably seven) daily diaries. We emailed them daily at 8 p.m. links 
to identical diaries for seven consecutive days; they had until 4 a.m. to complete diaries. We 
dropped participants (stopped emailing them links) as soon as they missed two diaries and lost 
eligibility for research compensation; these 27 participants did not differ significantly from the 
other participants on any variable (e.g., demographic variables). Both trait and daily diary data 
are available online (Huang & Berenbaum, 2018). 
Materials 
Trait Assessments 
  Self-(In)Security. We used the 13-item (e.g., “My weaknesses make me feel like there’s 
something wrong with me”; α = .91) Security of "I" Assessment (SofIA; Huang & Berenbaum, 
2017), which measures how much one accepts (or rejects) one’s weaknesses. Response options 
range from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). Higher scores indicate greater self-
security. Following Huang and Berenbaum (2017), before completing the SofIA, participants 
completed exercises to help them identify and think deeply about their weaknesses. Specifically, 
they: (a) read about the researchers’ definition of weaknesses and examples of weaknesses; (b) 
identified two of their own major weaknesses; and (c) answered open-ended questions about 
their weaknesses (for additional details, see Huang & Berenbaum, 2017). 
 Self-Esteem. We used the 10-item (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”; α 
= .90) Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Response options range from 1 (strongly 
agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Higher scores indicate greater self-esteem. 
 Neuroticism/Trait Negative Affectivity. We used the 8-item (e.g., “Gets nervous 





emotional instability and the tendency to experience unpleasant affect. Response options range 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate greater neuroticism. 
Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking. We used the 12-item (e.g., “Often I'm playing back 
over in my mind how I acted in a past situation”; α = .91) rumination subscale of the 
Rumination–Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) and the 16-item (e.g., 
“I am always worrying about something”; α = .91) Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Response options range from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree) for the RRQ and from 1 (not at all typical) to 5 (very typical) for the 
PSWQ. The standardized rumination and worry scores were strongly correlated (r = .49); we 
averaged them to form a composite repetitive thinking score. Higher scores indicate greater 
repetitive thinking. 
Daily Assessments 
 Self-(In)Security. We used a shortened, five-item version of the SofIA (αs, measured 
separately for each day, ranged from .92 to .96). We selected the five items because, in a 
previous study (N = 195): (a) they had the highest item-total correlations; (b) they were 
internally consistent (α = .84); and (c) the shortened version of the SofIA formed by these five 
items was very strongly correlated (r = .95) with the original, full-length version. We modified 
these five items and the instructions to ask about how much participants accepted (or rejected) 
their weaknesses on that particular day. The items were: (1) Today, my weaknesses made me 
feel like there’s something wrong with me; (2) My weaknesses made life less enjoyable today; 
(3) Because of my weaknesses, I found it hard to like myself today; (4) Because of my 





 Self-Esteem. We used a shortened, five-item version of the RSE (αs, measured separately 
for each day, ranged from .82 to .90). We selected the five items because, in a previous study (N 
= 195): (a) they had the highest item-total correlations; (b) they were internally consistent (α 
= .83); and (c) the shortened version of the RSE formed by these five items was very strongly 
correlated (r = .91) with the original, full-length version. We modified these five items and the 
instructions to ask about how participants felt about themselves overall on that particular day. 
The items were: (1) On the whole, I was satisfied with myself today; (2) I certainly felt useless at 
times today; (3) I wish I had more respect for myself today; (4) All in all, I am inclined to feel 
that I was a failure today; and (5) I took a positive attitude toward myself today. 
 Negative Affect. We used an expanded version (αs, measured separately for each day, 
ranged from .89 to .92) of the NA subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Specifically, because the original 10-item subscale (e.g., 
“distressed”) measures “only the high activation end points” (Larsen & Diener, 1992, p. 29), 
following previous research (e.g., Manjrekar & Berenbaum, 2012), we added three lower arousal 
items (e.g., “sad”). The instructions asked about NA experienced on that particular day. 
Response options range from 1 (slightly or not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
 Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking. Because no instrument that we know of measures 
daily repetitive thinking, we developed our own. Participants recalled “the unpleasant thing you 
thought about the most today” and responded to the following items: (1) How much did this 
concern bother you today? (2) How difficult was it to try to stop thinking about this concern 
today? (3) Estimate how much time in total you thought about this concern today. Response 





more than 2 hours). We averaged the items to form a repetitive thinking scale (αs, measured 
separately for each day, range from .82 to .84). Higher scores indicate greater repetitive thinking. 
 Content of Repetitive Thinking. We used the content categories used in previous 
research (e.g., Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007) about common life domains that 
people think repetitively about. Participants chose the most suitable category for their repetitive 
thinking: “yourself as a person (e.g., body image, not being an honest person)” (shortened to 
“self-evaluation” from here on), “interpersonal (e.g., relationships with friends, family, 




 We began by using the trait assessments to explore, at the between-individuals level, how 
self-(in)security and self-esteem were associated with repetitive thinking. We then tested whether 
either self-(in)security or self-esteem would continue to be associated with repetitive thinking 
after accounting for neuroticism. To do so, we computed partial correlations, removing the 
variance shared with neuroticism. Next, we tested whether either self-(in)security or self-esteem 
would continue to be associated with repetitive thinking after accounting for the alternative 
aspect of self-evaluation (e.g., whether self-(in)security would continue to be associated with 
repetitive thinking after accounting for self-esteem). To do so, we computed partial correlations, 
removing the variance shared with the alternative aspect of self-evaluation. Additionally, we 
tested whether either self-(in)security or self-esteem would continue to be associated with 
repetitive thinking after simultaneously accounting for neuroticism and the alternative aspect of 





thinking after simultaneously accounting for neuroticism and self-esteem). To do so, we 
computed partial correlations, removing the variance shared with neuroticism and the alternative 
aspect of self-evaluation. 
 As Table 2.1 shows, self-(in)security was significantly and strongly associated with 
repetitive thinking—and continued to be substantially associated with it even after accounting for 
neuroticism alone, for self-esteem alone, and for both neuroticism and self-esteem 
simultaneously. Self-esteem was also significantly associated with repetitive thinking, even after 
accounting for neuroticism alone. However, self-esteem was no longer associated with repetitive 







Between-Individuals Correlations Between  
Aspects of Self-Evaluation and Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking 
 Self-(In)Security Self-Esteem 
Zero-order correlations with repetitive thinking -.57*** -.35*** 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism -.37*** -.16* 
Partial correlations accounting for self-esteem -.47***  
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-esteem -.35***  
Partial correlations accounting for self-(in)security  .06 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-(in)security  .11 







 Next, using the daily assessments, we examined, at the within-individual level, whether 
either self-(in)security or self-esteem was associated with repetitive thinking. To do so, we used 
the MIXED procedure of the SAS 9.4 software
2
 to conduct multilevel modeling with maximum 
likelihood estimation. We specified repetitive thinking as the outcome variable in each model, 
included random intercepts, and used unstructured covariance structures and unstandardized 
coefficients (for model equations and SAS code, see Appendix). To focus on within-individual 
variance, we centered predictor variables on each individual’s own mean (as recommended by 
Enders & Tofighi, 2007; e.g., for self-(in)security, we subtracted the mean of all daily self-
(in)security scores of a particular individual from every daily self-(in)security score of that 
individual). 
 We present in Table 2.2 the results of analyses in which self-(in)security and/or self-
esteem is used to predict repetitive thinking. Self-(in)security was significantly associated with 
repetitive thinking at the within-individual level (Model #1), and this association remained 
significant even after accounting for NA alone (Model #2), for self-esteem alone (Model #5), and 
for NA and self-esteem simultaneously (Model #6). Similarly, self-esteem was significantly 
associated with repetitive thinking (Model #3), and continued to be so even after accounting for 
NA alone (Model #4) and for self-(in)security alone (Model #5). However, self-esteem was no 




                                                 
2
The third author, who has extensive experience with hierarchical linear modeling, used the HLM 7.03 software and 
independently conducted analyses based on their descriptions; the results were the same. 
3
Additionally, we tested whether self-(in)security from the previous day would prospectively predict changes in 
repetitive thinking. To do so, we specified today’s repetitive thinking as the outcome variable, and entered 
yesterday’s self-(in)security and yesterday’s repetitive thinking as predictors. Yesterday’s self-(in)security was not 
associated with today’s repetitive thinking after accounting for yesterday’s repetitive thinking (p > .85). The results 






Within-Individual Coefficient Estimates for  
Aspects of Self-Evaluation Predicting Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking 
Predicting repetitive thinking  Estimate SE df t 
Model #1      
Self-(in)security  -.36*** .04 535 -9.75 
Model #2      
NA  .74*** .07 534 10.63 
Self-(in)security  .17*** .04 534 -4.49 
Model #3      
Self-esteem  -.41*** .04 527 -9.28 
Model #4      
NA  .76*** .07 526 10.27 
Self-esteem  -.15** .05 525 -3.08 
Model #5      
Self-esteem  -.25*** .05 527 -4.98 
Self-(in)security  -.24*** .04 530 -5.47 
Model #6      
NA  .70*** .08 526 9.21 
Self-esteem  -.08 .05 526 -1.49 
Self-(in)security  -.14*** .04 527 -3.43 
 
Note. NA = negative affect. Predictors are Level 1 and, to focus on 
within-individual variance, centered on each individual’s own mean. 
Models include random intercepts; see Appendix for equations and SAS 
code. Coefficients are unstandardized. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
repetitive thinking, this occurs within a timeframe shorter than a day (e.g., within a few minutes). Further 
investigation will be needed to test this (e.g., using ecological momentary assessment and collecting data every 10 
minutes; examining self-(in)security and changes in repetitive thinking under laboratory conditions by using 





 Next, we tested whether the content of repetitive thinking moderated either self-
(in)security’s or self-esteem’s association with repetitive thinking. To do so, we dummy-coded 
each content category (e.g., to test for moderation by the self-evaluation category, 1 = the 
repetitive thinking revolved around self-evaluation; 0 = otherwise). We tested eight models, each 
including: (a) either self-(in)security or self-esteem, (b) one content category (self-evaluation, 
interpersonal, achievement, or health), and (c) an interaction term for (a) and (b). As expected, 
the self-evaluation category significantly moderated self-(in)security’s, but not self-esteem’s, 
association with repetitive thinking (for self-(in)security, coefficient estimate = .29, SE = .13, 
t(579) = 2.24, p = .03; for self-esteem, coefficient estimate = .50, SE = .36, t(587) = 1.40, p 
= .16). Moreover, the self-evaluation category was the only category that significantly moderated 
self-(in)security’s association with repetitive thinking. No category moderated self-esteem’s 
association with repetitive thinking. The nature of the moderation is illustrated in Table 2.3, in 
which self-(in)security’s associations with repetitive thinking are presented separately for: (a) 
repetitive thinking related to self-evaluation (on the left side of Table 2.3); and (b) repetitive 
thinking unrelated to self-evaluation (on the right side of Table 2.3). As shown in the top row 
(Model #1), self-(in)security’s association with repetitive thinking was, as expected, stronger 
when such thinking revolved around self-evaluation than when it did not. It is important to note 
that self-(in)security significantly predicted repetitive thinking no matter whether such thinking 
revolved around self-evaluation. Moreover, as shown in the lower rows, no matter the content, 
self-(in)security’s association with repetitive thinking remained significant even after accounting 
for NA alone (Model #2), for self-esteem alone (Model #3), and for NA and self-esteem 







Within-Individual Coefficient Estimates for Self-(In)Security Predicting 
Repetitive Thinking: Related or Unrelated to Self-Evaluation 
  Content of repetitive thinking 
  Related to 
self-evaluation 
 Unrelated to 
self-evaluation 
Predicting repetitive thinking  Estimate SE df t  Estimate SE df t 
Model #1           
Self-(in)security  -.62*** .11 58 -5.49  -.33*** .04 467 -8.17 
Model #2           
NA  .55* .25 47 2.18  .79*** .07 463 10.78 
Self-(in)security  -.50*** .12 59 -3.97  -.12** .04 462 -3.04 
Model #3           
Self-esteem  -.18 .41 70 -.44  -.54*** .11 460 -5.01 
Self-(in)security  -.63*** .15 69 -4.28  -.19*** .05 463 -4.09 
Model #4           
NA  .55* .26 42 2.11  .75*** .08 457 9.33 
Self-esteem  .16 .43 71 .37  -.15 .11 458 -1.43 
Self-(in)security  -.57*** .14 68 -3.93  -.09* .04 458 -2.09 
 
Note. NA = negative affect. Predictors are Level 1 and, to focus on within-individual variance, centered on 
each individual’s own mean. Models include random intercepts; see Appendix for equations and SAS code. 
Coefficients are unstandardized. 







We investigated self-insecurity’s link with unpleasant repetitive thinking, a 
transdiagnostic process in internalizing psychopathology. Both between-individuals and within-
individual results supported our hypothesis that the more one rejects one’s weaknesses, the more 
one dwells on negative thoughts. Moreover, the content of repetitive thinking moderated the 
association: self-insecurity was more strongly associated with the level of repetitive thinking 
when such thinking revolved around self-evaluation than when such thinking did not. All these 
findings remained significant even after accounting for self-esteem and neuroticism/NA. 
Our findings reveal something special about self-insecurity’s link with repetitive 
thinking. For example, at the between-individuals level, self-insecurity continued to be 
associated with repetitive thinking even after accounting for self-esteem and neuroticism/NA, 
whereas self-esteem was no longer associated with repetitive thinking after accounting for self-
insecurity. At the within-individual level, the content of repetitive thinking moderated self-
insecurity’s—but not self-esteem’s—association with repetitive thinking. These findings support 
our proposal that honing in on how people relate to their weaknesses (instead of looking at only 
global self-evaluation) is key to understanding the link between self-evaluation and repetitive 
thinking. 
The robust association between self-insecurity and repetitive thinking is consistent with 
our theory that the former contributes to the latter. Although the opposite is also possible (that 
repetitive thinking contributes to self-insecurity), we conjecture that this would happen only if 
the repetitive thinking revolves around one’s weaknesses—but in that case, it is unclear to us 
why one would think repetitively about weaknesses if one is not bothered by them in the first 





thinking about weaknesses. We also acknowledge the possibility that no causal relationship 
exists between self-insecurity and repetitive thinking, that a third variable explains the 
association between them. Although no research can completely rule out this possibility, a major 
strength of the present study is addressing this issue by: (a) accounting for the most likely 
candidates for such third variable (self-esteem and neuroticism/NA); and (b) using both between-
individuals and within-individual methods. That self-insecurity’s association with repetitive 
thinking remained significant even after accounting for self-esteem and neuroticism/NA, 
rendered less plausible the alternative explanation that self-esteem or neuroticism/NA drove our 
findings. That this association was found at both between-individuals and within-individual 
levels, rendered less plausible the alternative explanation that individual differences in an 
unexamined third variable (e.g., history of psychopathology) drove our findings. To address our 
study’s limitations, future research should use longer longitudinal methods and true experiments 
(in which the researcher manipulates one variable to test its effect on another variable) to further 
explore potential causal relations between self-insecurity and repetitive thinking. 
The findings are consistent with our theory that feeling unsafe in one’s self increases 
repetitive thinking about a broad range of threats—especially self-evaluation threats. Future 
research should explore potential mediators of self-insecurity’s link with repetitive thinking. We 
theorize that feeling self-insecure, for example, leads one to “take things personally”: one 
becomes hypervigilant about how day-to-day unpleasant occurrences may reflect badly on 
oneself. Therefore, we recommend that future research examine the degree to which one’s 
concerns threaten self-evaluation, and test whether this variable mediates self-insecurity’s 
association with repetitive thinking. Another potential mediator is the perceived cost of threats. 





undesirable outcomes appear particularly intimidating to one who feels compromised by 
weaknesses. Future research could test this hypothesis by examining “how bad” one perceives 
undesirable outcomes to be. 
The present study began to explore how accepting/rejecting one’s own weaknesses may 
influence emotional wellbeing. The robust association found between self-insecurity and 
repetitive thinking raises the possibility that self-insecurity—like repetitive thinking—is a 
transdiagnostic risk factor for a broad range of internalizing psychopathology. Hence, our most 
important recommendation for future research is to investigate self-insecurity’s role in the 
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Study 2: Self-Insecurity Is Associated With—and Prospectively Predicts— 
Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking and Depression 
 
From ancient poetry, teachings of major religions, to the acceptance and mindfulness-
based psychotherapies that emerged over the past several decades (e.g., Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, 
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996), people have advocated for the acceptance of all things unpleasant in 
life, including—but not limited to—one’s own weaknesses. Everyone has weaknesses, things 
about themselves that make them feel vulnerable or flawed (e.g., unflattering personal 
characteristics, painful past experiences). Observing that the words “secure” and “insecure” in 
languages across the world describe the varying degrees to which people feel comfortable with 
versus bothered by their weaknesses, Huang and Berenbaum (2017) coined the terms “self-
security” and “self-insecurity” to describe the continuum ranging from fully accepting one’s own 
weaknesses to utterly rejecting them. They also began to empirically validate self-(in)security as 
a trait distinct from well-known aspects of self-evaluation. For example, they found that self-
(in)security is substantially associated—but not redundant—with self-esteem (e.g., Rosenberg, 
1965), which suggests that even people who feel positive about their selves overall can be 
rejecting, specifically, of their own weaknesses. Similarly, self-(in)security was substantially 
associated, but not redundant, with self-compassion (Huang & Berenbaum, 2017), which 
concerns how one responds to emotional pain in general (Neff, 2003). (For more information 
about how self-(in)security differs from related constructs, see Huang & Berenbaum, 2017.) 





narcissism, fear of negative evaluation, (in)secure attachment, close relationship quality; Huang 
& Berenbaum, 2017).  
Recently, Huang and Berenbaum (2018) investigated self-(in)security’s link with 
unpleasant repetitive thinking (i.e., engaging in negatively-valenced streams of thoughts that are 
often hard to control; Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003; Ehring & Watkins, 2008). 
Typically studied in its specific forms (e.g., rumination, worry), this transdiagnostic construct 
appears to cause and perpetuate a wide variety of internalizing psychopathology (e.g., Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008; McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013). Huang and Berenbaum (2018) 
theorized that self-insecurity should increase repetitive thinking because difficulty confronting 
one’s weaknesses should heighten one’s perception of threats—which is what initiates and fuels 
repetitive thinking (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Berenbaum, 2010). Consistent with this 
theory, they found that self-insecurity was strongly associated with repetitive thinking—even 
after accounting for self-esteem or neuroticism/trait negative affect. In fact, this association was 
found at both the between-individuals and the within-individual levels, which suggests that it 
could not be attributed to individual differences in any other variable. Given that Huang and 
Berenbaum’s study (2018) was cross-sectional, the present study aimed to not only replicate, but 
also extend, their findings by using longitudinal methods to investigate whether self-insecurity 
prospectively predicts increases in repetitive thinking. 
One implication of self-insecurity’s robust link with repetitive thinking is that self-
insecurity may be—like repetitive thinking—a transdiagnostic risk factor for internalizing 
psychopathology. The present study is the first to investigate this possibility. Specifically, we 
focused on self-insecurity’s potential association with major depressive disorder (MDD), a 





for individuals, but also a grave burden on societies globally (e.g., Kessler et al., 2009; World 
Health Organization, 2002). 
Extensive research suggests that maladaptive aspects of self-evaluation, such as low self-
esteem, contribute to depression (e.g., Sowislo & Orth, 2013). We proposed that self-insecurity 
is also an aspect of self-evaluation that contributes to depression. Supported by empirical 
evidence (e.g., Alloy, Abramson, Whitehouse, Hogan, Panzarella, & Rose, 2006), multiple major 
theories of depression propose that cognitive vulnerability factors—including those related to the 
self—predispose people to depression. For example, Beck’s theory of depression (1967) 
identified negatively biased construals of the self, which he labeled as negative self-schemas. 
Specifically, Beck postulated a feedback loop in which negative self-schemas bias one’s 
information-processing of unpleasant life events and mold the resulting interpretations which, in 
turn, reinforce the negative self-schemas. It is easy to imagine that self-insecurity should feed 
into negative self-schemas: the more one rejects weaknesses, the more continuously activated are 
one’s negative self-schemas, and the more depression one should experience. Similarly, 
Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy’s hopelessness theory (1989; built on the reformulated theory of 
helplessness and depression by Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) identified internal 
attributional style as a cognitive vulnerability factor. Internal attributional style is the tendency to 
attribute the causes of unpleasant life events to negative self-characteristics. Such attributions 
lead to hopelessness, a proximal sufficient cause of depression symptoms (Abramson, Metalsky, 
& Alloy, 1989). We theorize that self-insecurity catalyzes this process, because weaknesses are a 
subset of negative self-characteristics. The more one rejects one’s weaknesses, the more readily 
one should attribute unpleasant events to them, leading to hopelessness and depression. In sum, 





difficulties related to self-evaluation, rejecting them should add fuel to the fire, aggravating 
emotional distress and exacerbating maladaptive self-evaluation (Huang & Berenbaum, 2018). 
We theorize that more self-insecure individuals would be more vulnerable to depression because 
rejecting weaknesses potentiates a variety of cognitive vulnerability factors. 
In the present study, we began to test our theory by investigating whether self-insecurity 
would be associated with lifetime history of MDD and MDD symptom severity. Finding an 
association would be consistent with our theory that self-insecurity contributes to depression. Of 
course, an alternative explanation for the association is that depression contributes to self-
insecurity. To explore these possibilities, we tested whether self-insecurity would prospectively 
predict changes in depression, and vice versa. We also assessed several specific facets of 
depression: negative affect (NA), positive affect (PA), and anhedonic depression. 
In sum, the present study had two goals: (a) to further examine Huang and Berenbaum’s 
hypothesis (2018) that self-insecurity contributes to repetitive thinking; and (b) to begin to 
examine our hypothesis that self-insecurity contributes to depression. To achieve the first goal, 
we: (a) examined whether the present study would replicate self-insecurity’s strong cross-
sectional association with repetitive thinking (Huang & Berenbaum, 2018); and (b) tested 
whether self-insecurity would prospectively predict increases in repetitive thinking. To achieve 
the second goal, we examined whether self-insecurity would be associated with lifetime MDD—
even after accounting for concurrent depression. We also examined whether: (a) depression 
prospectively predicted increases in self-insecurity; and (b) self-insecurity prospectively 
predicted increases in depression (and related variables, e.g., NA). We hypothesized that self-
insecurity would prospectively predict depression, but depression would not prospectively 





with repetitive thinking/depression would change (if at all) after accounting for self-esteem or 
neuroticism, to render less plausible the alternative explanation that self-insecurity’s shared 
variance with self-esteem or neuroticism drove the associations. Lastly, for comparison, we 




 Participants were 195 undergraduates (62.3% female), ranging in age from 18 to 22 (M = 
19.1, SD = 1.1). Racially, the majority (65.2%) identified as White, followed by 20.2% Asian, 
11.4% Black/African American, and 3.1% other or multiracial; ethnically, 9.8% identified as 
Latino/Hispanic. We used a recruitment strategy intended to obtain a sample that covered a wide 
range of depression history and depressive symptom severity. Specifically, we recruited through 
a Department of Psychology participant pool, and emailed invitations to individuals who had 
indicated on a screening questionnaire that they had sought or considered seeking treatment 
for depression. All participants received course credit for participation. 
Procedure 
  Participants were tested individually in two 50-minute lab sessions separated by 
approximately one month; the number of days between sessions ranged from 28 to 35 (M = 32.9; 
SD = 2.1). During each session, participants completed the same set of tasks and measures, 
including an interview assessing Major Depressive Disorder. Seven participants did not attend 
the second session. They did not differ significantly from the other participants in age or any 
score on questionnaires completed during the first session; none of them endorsed any MDD 






  Self-(In)Security. We used the 13-item (e.g., “My weaknesses make me feel like there’s 
something wrong with me”; α = .90) Security of "I" Assessment (SofIA; Huang & Berenbaum, 
2017), which measures how much one accepts (or rejects) one’s weaknesses. Response options 
range from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). Higher scores indicate greater self-
security (i.e., less self-insecurity). Following Huang and Berenbaum (2017), before completing 
the SofIA, participants completed exercises to help them identify and think deeply about their 
weaknesses. Specifically, they: (a) read about the researchers’ definition of weaknesses and 
examples of weaknesses; (b) identified two of their own major weaknesses; and (c) answered 
open-ended questions about their weaknesses (for additional details, see Huang & Berenbaum, 
2017). 
 Self-Esteem. We used the 10-item (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”; α 
= .90) Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Response options range from 1 (strongly 
agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Higher scores indicate greater self-esteem. 
 Neuroticism/Trait Negative Affectivity. We used the 8-item (e.g., “Gets nervous 
easily”; α = .83) subscale of the Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999), which measures 
emotional instability and the tendency to experience unpleasant affect. Response options range 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate greater neuroticism. 
Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking. We used the 12-item (e.g., “Often I'm playing back 
over in my mind how I acted in a past situation”; α = .91) rumination subscale of the 
Rumination–Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) and the 16-item (e.g., 
“I am always worrying about something”; α = .94) Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 





during the past two weeks. Response options range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree) for the RRQ and from 1 (not at all typical) to 5 (very typical) for the PSWQ. The 
standardized rumination and worry scores were strongly correlated (r = .58); we averaged them 
to derive a composite repetitive thinking score. Higher scores indicate greater repetitive thinking. 
 Negative Affect. We used an expanded version (α = .91) of the NA subscale of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
Specifically, because the original 10-item subscale (e.g., “distressed”) measures “only the high 
activation end points” (Larsen & Diener, 1992, p. 29), following previous research (e.g., 
Manjrekar & Berenbaum, 2012), we added three lower arousal items (e.g., “sad”). The 
instructions asked about NA during the past two weeks. Response options range from 1 (slightly 
or not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
 Positive affect. Like for NA, we used an expanded version (α = .93) of the PA subscale 
of the PANAS: we added three lower arousal items (e.g., “happy”). The instructions asked about 
PA during the past two weeks. Response options range from 1 (slightly or not at all) to 7 
(extremely). 
 Anhedonic depression. We used the 8-item version (e.g., “felt like nothing was very 
enjoyable”; α = .85) of the 22-item anhedonic depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety 
Symptoms Questionnaire (Watson, Weber, Assenheimer, Clark, Strauss, & McCormick, 1995), 
because the shortened version predicts current depressive disorder better than the full subscale 
(Bredemeier et al., 2010). The instructions asked about anhedonic depression during the past two 
weeks. Response options range from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Higher scores 
indicate greater anhedonic depression. Our sample’s scores ranged from 8.0 to 39.0 (M = 19.3; 





previous large, unselected undergraduate samples (M = 18.4, SD = 3.3 in Kim, Saw, & Zane, 
2015; M = 15.1, SD = 6.2 in Tran, 2015).  
Depression Assessment 
 We used the mood episodes module of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR 
Axis I Disorders (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002). We focused on MDD using 
DSM-5 criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). We dropped participants (n = 4) who 
reported manic or hypomanic episodes, which exclude MDD. Additionally, we excluded the 
Time 2 data of participants who received intervention (e.g., therapy) initiated between Time 1 
and Time 2 (n = 3). The first author, an advanced clinical psychology graduate student trained in 
using the SCID-I and blind to questionnaire responses,
4
 conducted all interviews. To examine 
interrater reliability, a second advanced clinical psychology graduate student (also trained in 
using the SCID-I and blind to questionnaire responses) independently rated the audio recordings 
of 20 randomly selected participants’ interviews. 
 MDD. At Time 1, we assessed whether participants had ever met DSM-5 criteria for 
MDD at any point in their life (including at Time 1). Just over one-quarter (26.2%) of our sample 
met diagnostic criteria for lifetime MDD; 5.1% of our sample met diagnostic criteria for MDD at 
Time 1. We calculated interrater reliability between the raters' diagnoses. For lifetime MDD, 
percent agreement was 95% and kappa was .90; for current MDD at Time 1, percent agreement 
was 100% and kappa was 1.00. 
 MDD symptom severity. At both Time 1 and Time 2, we assessed the severity of major 
depressive symptoms during the past two weeks. We rated each symptom on a scale from 0 
(absent) to 2 (present); 1 indicates sub-threshold presence. We summed the nine major 
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depressive symptoms’ ratings to derive the symptom severity score. Higher scores indicate 
greater symptom severity. Our sample’s scores ranged from 0 to 16 (M = 1.1; SD = 3.3). 
Interrater reliability of the symptom severity scores, measured using the intraclass correlation 
coefficient, treating raters as random effects and the mean of the raters as the unit of reliability, 
was .97 for MDD at Time 1 and .93 for MDD at Time 2. 
 
Results 
Is Self-(In)Security Associated With Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking? 
We began by examining whether the present study replicated self-(in)security’s strong 
association with repetitive thinking (Huang & Berenbaum, 2018). The present study indeed 
replicated the strong association
5
 (r = -.64, p = .00). Self-esteem was similarly correlated with 
repetitive thinking (r = -.63, p = .00). The present study also replicated the finding (Huang & 
Berenbaum, 2018) that self-insecurity continued to be significantly associated with repetitive 
thinking even after account for neuroticism (r = -.32, p = .00) or self-esteem (r = -.35, p = .00). 
 
Does Self-(In)Security Prospectively Predict Changes in Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking? 
Next, we tested our hypothesis that self-(in)security would prospectively predict changes 
in repetitive thinking. To do so, we conducted hierarchical multiple regression (HMR) analyses 
with repetitive thinking at Time 2 as the dependent variable. We entered repetitive thinking at 
Time 1 in the first step, and then self-(in)security in the second step. As expected, self-
(in)security significantly predicted changes in repetitive thinking (R2 = .01, Fchange (1, 183) = 
5.56, p = .02). Specifically, participants with lower levels of self-security tended to report 
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increased levels of repetitive thinking. In contrast, self-esteem did not prospectively predict 
changes in repetitive thinking (R2 = .00, Fchange (1, 180) = 1.07, p = .30). 
We then examined whether self-(in)security continued to prospectively predict changes in 
repetitive thinking after accounting for neuroticism. To do so, we entered neuroticism in step 
two before entering self-(in)security in step three. As expected, self-(in)security continued to 
significantly predict changes in repetitive thinking even after accounting for neuroticism (R2 
= .01, Fchange (1, 182) = 4.07, p = .045). 
Finally, we examined whether self-(in)security continued to prospectively predict 
changes in repetitive thinking after accounting for self-esteem. To do so, we entered self-esteem 
in step two before entering self-(in)security in step three. As expected, self-(in)security continued 
to significantly predict changes in repetitive thinking even after accounting for self-esteem (R2 
=.01, Fchange (1, 178) = 3.90, p =.049). 
 
Is Self-(In)Security Associated With Lifetime MDD? 
Next, we tested whether self-(in)security was associated with lifetime MDD. As can be 
seen in Table 3.1, compared to participants without lifetime MDD, participants with lifetime 
MDD were significantly more rejecting of their weaknesses (t(192) = 5.22, p = .00). They also 
had significantly lower self-esteem (t(188) = 3.90, p = .00). 
Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Aspects of Self-Evaluation by Lifetime MDD 
 Without lifetime MDD 
(n = 144) 
With lifetime MDD 
(n = 51) 
 
Cohen’s D 
Self-(In)Security 3.8 (1.1) 2.9 (1.1) .82 
Self-Esteem 3.0 (0.5) 2.6 (0.6) .72 






To explore the plausibility that self-(in)security’s association with lifetime MDD was 
driven by concurrent depression, we tested whether the association held after considering 
concurrent depression. To do so, we excluded participants with MDD at Time 1 (n = 10), and 
conducted binary logistic regression (BLR) analyses with lifetime MDD as the dependent 
variable. We entered MDD symptom severity at Time 1 in the first step, and then self-
(in)security in the second step. Even after excluding participants with MDD at Time 1, and also 
accounting for Time 1 MDD symptom severity, self-(in)security continued to be significantly 
associated with lifetime MDD (Wald = 12.61, df = 1, p = .00). We conducted a similar analysis 
for self-esteem, which also continued to be significantly associated with lifetime MDD (Wald = 
5.59, df = 1, p = .02). 
Next, we tested whether self-(in)security continued to be associated with lifetime MDD 
after accounting for neuroticism. To do so, we added neuroticism to the BLR analysis: we 
excluded participants with Time 1 MDD, and then entered: (a) Time 1 MDD symptom severity 
in the first step; (b) neuroticism in the second step; and (c) self-(in)security in the third step. 
Even after excluding participants with MDD at Time 1, and also accounting for Time 1 MDD 
symptom severity and neuroticism, self-(in)security continued to be significantly associated with 
lifetime MDD (Wald = 7.03, df = 1, p = .01). We conducted a similar analysis for self-esteem. 
Self-esteem was no longer associated with lifetime MDD after accounting for neuroticism (Wald 
= 1.61, df = 1, p = .20). 
Next, we tested whether self-(in)security continued to be associated with lifetime MDD 
after accounting for self-esteem. To do so, we added self-esteem to the BLR analysis: we 
excluded participants with Time 1 MDD, and entered: (a) Time 1 MDD symptom severity in the 





excluding participants with MDD at Time 1, and also accounting for Time 1 MDD symptom 
severity and self-esteem, self-(in)security continued to be significantly associated with lifetime 
MDD (Wald = 6.73, df = 1, p = .01). We conducted a similar analysis for self-esteem. Self-
esteem was no longer associated with lifetime MDD after accounting for self-(in)security (Wald 
= .05, df = 1, p = .82). 
A potential explanation for self-(in)security’s association with lifetime MDD is that 
depression contributes to self-(in)security. To explore the plausibility of this explanation, we 
tested whether depression prospectively predicted changes in self-(in)security. To do so, we 
conducted an HMR analysis with self-(in)security at Time 2 as the dependent variable. We 
entered: (a) self-(in)security at Time 1 in the first step; and (b) lifetime MDD and Time 1 MDD 
symptom severity in the second step. Depression
6
 did not predict changes in self-(in)security 
(R2 = .00, Fchange (2, 182) = .14, p = .87). 
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Does Self-(In)Security Prospectively Predict Changes in Depression/Related Variables? 
Before testing our hypotheses about prospective prediction, we examined self-
(in)security’s concurrent associations with
7
: (a) MDD symptom severity, (b) negative affect, (c) 
positive affect, and (d) anhedonic depression. As can be seen in Table 3.2, self-(in)security was 
significantly correlated with all variables in the expected directions; its correlations with negative 
affect, positive affect, and anhedonic depression were particularly strong. Self-esteem was 
similarly correlated with all variables; its correlations’ strengths did not significantly differ from 
self(in)security’s correlations’ strengths. 
Table 3.2 
Correlations Between Aspects of Self-Evaluation and Depression/Related Variables 
 
Self-(In)Security Self-Esteem 
MDD symptom severity -.32** -.35** 
NA -.57** -.59** 
PA .40** .55** 
Anhedonic depression -.52** -.50** 
Note. Higher self-(in)security scores indicate more accepting (or less rejecting) of one’s weaknesses. MDD = major 
depressive disorder; NA = negative affect; PA = positive affect. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Next, we tested our hypotheses that self-(in)security would prospectively predict changes 
in depression/related variables. To do so, we conducted HMR analyses, each with a single 
depression/related variable at Time 2 as the dependent variable (e.g., MDD symptom severity at 
Time 2). We entered the variable at Time 1 in the first step (e.g., MDD symptom severity at 
Time 1), and then self-(in)security in the second step. As can be seen in Table 3.3, self-
(in)security significantly predicted changes in MDD symptom severity, NA, and anhedonic 
depression. Specifically, participants with lower levels of self-security tended to report increased 
levels of MDD symptom severity, NA, and anhedonic depression. In contrast, self-esteem 
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significantly predicted changes in only MDD symptom severity and anhedonic depression. 
Neither self-(in)security nor self-esteem predicted changes in PA. 
Next, we examined whether self-(in)security continued to prospectively predict changes 
in the variables after accounting for neuroticism. To do so, we entered neuroticism in step two 
before entering self-(in)security in step three. As expected, self-(in)security continued to predict 
changes in MDD symptom severity
8
, NA, and anhedonic depression even after accounting for 
neuroticism. Self-esteem continued to predict changes in MDD symptom severity and anhedonic 
depression even after accounting for neuroticism. 
Finally, we examined whether self-(in)security continued to prospectively predict 
changes in the variables after accounting for self-esteem. To do so, we entered self-esteem in 
step two before entering self-(in)security in step three. We conducted similar analyses for self-
esteem (examining whether it prospectively predicted changes in the variables after accounting 
for self-(in)security). Self-(in)security continued to significantly predict changes in NA even 
after accounting for self-esteem. Self-esteem continued to significantly predict changes in 
anhedonic depression even after accounting for self-(in)security. 
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R2 for Aspects of Self-Evaluation Predicting Changes in Depression/Related Variables 
Changes in … Self-(In)Security as predictor Self-Esteem as predictor 














 .00 .02* .02
t
 .01 
NA .02** .02* .02* .00 .00 .00 
PA .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 
Anhedonic 
depression 
.02* .02* .00 .04** .04** .02* 
 
Note. MDD = major depressive disorder; NA = negative affect; PA = positive affect. 
t 







The present study investigated the link between self-insecurity, an aspect of self-
evaluation defined as the rejection of one’s own weaknesses, and unpleasant repetitive thinking, 
a transdiagnostic process that appears to cause and perpetuate various internalizing 
psychopathology. We replicated Huang and Berenbaum’s finding (2018), that self-insecurity was 
strongly associated with repetitive thinking. Additionally, we found that self-insecurity 
prospectively predicted repetitive thinking—even after accounting for neuroticism or self-
esteem.  
This longitudinal finding is the strongest piece of empirical evidence to date supporting 
the theory that rejecting one’s weaknesses increases repetitive thinking. To more rigorously test 
the proposed causal relationship between self-insecurity and repetitive thinking, future research 
should use true experiments (in which the researcher manipulates one variable to test the effect 
on another variable). To elucidate the precise mechanism by which self-insecurity may 
contribute to repetitive thinking, future research should explore potential mediators, such as the 
degree to which one perceives threats to be costly or to reflect badly on oneself. 
The present study also began to investigate the possibility that self-insecurity—like 
repetitive thinking—is a transdiagnostic risk factor for internalizing psychopathology. 
Specifically, we used a remitted depression design to examine self-insecurity’s association with 
clinically significant levels of depression: we found that, compared to individuals without 
lifetime MDD, individuals with lifetime MDD were more rejecting of their weaknesses. 
Moreover, this association remained significant even after excluding individuals who 
concurrently met the diagnostic criteria for MDD, and even after accounting for MDD symptom 





explanation that current depression, self-esteem, or neuroticism drove self-insecurity’s 
association with lifetime MDD. Additionally, using a prospective design, we found that whereas 
depression
9
 did not prospectively predict increased self-insecurity, self-insecurity did 
prospectively predict increased MDD symptom severity, anhedonic depression, and NA. Here 
again, our results are consistent with self-insecurity contributing to depression. 
Although our findings do not prove that self-insecurity is a risk factor for MDD, they 
serve as promising preliminary evidence consistent with our theory, and lead us to the following 
three recommendations. First, future research should try to replicate our findings. Second, to 
render even less plausible the alternative explanation that individual differences in another 
variable drove self-insecurity’s associations with depression and related variables, future 
research should examine these associations at the between-individuals and the within-individual 
levels simultaneously; this could be achieved, for example, by complementing cross-sectional 
methods with daily diary methods. Third, to more rigorously test self-insecurity as a risk factor 
for MDD, future research should use methods such as a behavioral high risk approach (see Just, 
Abramson, & Alloy, 2001): select individuals with low and high levels of self-insecurity, and 
then examine whether self-insecurity would prospectively predict clinically significant increases 
in depression (onset or recurrence). If the findings continue to be consistent with our theory that 
self-insecurity contributes to MDD, then self-insecurity may prove both a useful tool for 
identifying high-risk individuals and a worthwhile treatment target. 
Our strongest recommendation is the continued investigation of self-insecurity as a 
potential risk factor for a broad range of psychopathology. Given its robust associations with 
repetitive thinking and lifetime MDD, future research should examine its role in other 
internalizing psychopathology (e.g., social anxiety disorder). Moreover, future research should 
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venture beyond—for example, is self-insecurity a risk factor for externalizing psychopathology, 
too, such as substance use disorder? We theorize that self-insecurity also predisposes people to 
post-traumatic stress disorder, because the more rejecting one is of weaknesses, the more 
vulnerable one should be to developing—after exposure to trauma—overly negative assumptions 
about oneself and the world. One would be more likely to self-blame, experience intense 
negative affect, and avoid trauma-related thoughts, feelings, or reminders. Finally, we 
recommend that future research examine self-insecurity in diverse populations varying in age, 
education, socioeconomic status, and culture, because these variables influence how self-
evaluation is associated with emotional wellbeing/psychopathology (e.g., Heine, Lehman, 
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Study 3: Exploring Hypothesized Mediators Of Self-(In)Security’s Association With  
Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking 
 
Through ancient poetry, religious teachings, and acceptance and mindfulness-based 
psychotherapies,
10
 people across time and cultures have called for accepting everything 
unpleasant in life—including, but not limited to, unpleasant parts of the self. Everyone has 
weaknesses, things that make them feel flawed or vulnerable (e.g., unflattering personal 
characteristics, painful past experiences). Huang and Berenbaum (2017) observed that the words 
“secure” and “insecure” across diverse languages (e.g., English, Spanish, Chinese) describe the 
varying degrees to which people feel comfortable with, versus bothered by, their own 
weaknesses. Accordingly, they coined “self-security” and “self-insecurity” to describe the 
continuum ranging from fully accepting one’s own weaknesses to utterly rejecting them. They 
also began to empirically validate self-(in)security as a construct distinct from well-known and 
important aspects of self-evaluation. For example, self-(in)security is substantially associated—
but not redundant—with self-esteem (e.g., Rosenberg, 1965), suggesting that even people who 
feel positive about their global selves can reject, specifically, their weaknesses. Similarly, self-
(in)security is substantially associated, but not redundant, with self-compassion (Huang & 




Because weaknesses should be a ready source of emotional distress and difficulties 
related to self-evaluation, Huang and Berenbaum (2018a) theorized that rejecting weaknesses 
                                                 
10
 For examples, see Huang and Berenbaum, 2017. 
11






adds fuel to the fire: aggravating emotional distress, exacerbating maladaptive self-evaluation, 
and ultimately damaging mental health. Indeed, new research found that self-(in)security is 
associated with a wide array of variables related to wellbeing, including shame-proneness, 
pathological narcissism, (in)secure attachment style, close relationship quality, empathy, and 
helping behavior (Huang & Berenbaum, 2017; Eckland, Huang, & Berenbaum, 2018). Notably, 
self-(in)security’s associations with unpleasant repetitive thinking, anhedonic depression, and 
fear of negative evaluation remained significant—even after accounting for self-esteem or 
neuroticism/negative affect, rendering less plausible the alternative explanation that these related 
constructs drove the findings (Huang & Berenbaum, 2018a; Huang & Berenbaum, 2018b). 
Taken together, all these findings highlight the value of further investigating self-(in)security’s 
potential links with other clinically significant variables (e.g., alcohol problems, post traumatic 
stress disorder). 
The present study focused on extending the research on self-(in)security’s link with 
unpleasant repetitive thinking. Also called perseverative/persistent negative thinking, unpleasant 
repetitive thinking means engaging in negatively-valenced streams of thoughts that are often 
hard to control (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003; Ehring & Watkins, 2008). It is 
typically studied in its specific forms (e.g., rumination, worry),
12
 and appears to be a 
transdiagnostic construct that causes and perpetuates a broad range of internalizing 
psychopathology (e.g., Ehring & Watkins, 2008; McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013). 
Huang and Berenbaum (2018a) theorized that difficulty accepting one’s weaknesses should 
increase one’s perception of threats, which in turn increases repetitive thinking (Borkovec, 
Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Berenbaum, 2010). Consistent with this theory, they found (Huang & 
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Berenbaum, 2018a)—and then replicated (Huang & Berenbaum, 2018b)—self-insecurity’s 
strong association with repetitive thinking. Notably, this association was found at both the 
between-individuals level (more self-insecure individuals think repetitively more than others) 
and the within-individual level (one thinks repetitively more on more self-insecure days), 
rendering less plausible the alternative explanation that individual differences in an unexamined 
third variable drove the findings. Moreover, that self-insecurity prospectively predicted repetitive 
thinking above and beyond neuroticism or self-esteem (Huang & Berenbaum, 2018b) suggests 
that self-insecurity may be—like repetitive thinking—a transdiagnostic risk factor for 
internalizing psychopathology. 
Nevertheless, research thus far examining the link between self-insecurity and repetitive 
thinking has at least two limitations. The first is using solely self-reports. The present study 
addressed this limitation by incorporating reports of repetitive thinking by participants’ close 
others (family, romantic partners, and long-term friends). The second limitation is not having 
elucidated the precise mechanism by which self-insecurity may contribute to repetitive thinking. 
The present study addressed this limitation by beginning to explore potential mediators. 
Specifically, we examined three potential mediators: the perceived self-evaluation relevance of 
threats, the perceived cost of threats, and discomfort with ambiguity. 
The perceived self-evaluation relevance of threats is how much one sees threats to be, 
specifically, threats to self-evaluation. Research on repetitive thinking shows that people are 
often troubled by concerns related to self-evaluation. For example, rumination, a common form 
of repetitive thinking, entails personal losses and failures (Papageorgiou, 2006; Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999), and empirical research on worry (another common form of repetitive thinking) 





dishonest, how unattractive; Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). Huang and 
Berenbaum (2018a) hypothesized that self-insecurity leads to increased perceived self-evaluation 
relevance of threats, which in turn leads to increased repetitive thinking (i.e., perceived self-
evaluation relevance of threats mediates the link between self-security and repetitive thinking. 
The second potential mediator that Huang and Berenbaum (2018a) proposed is the 
perceived cost of threats, or “how bad” one see threats to be. Implicated in various internalizing 
psychopathology (e.g., Foa, Franklin, Perry, Herbert, 1996; Butler and Mathews, 1983), the 
perceived cost of threats increases repetitive thinking (Rapee & Abbott, 2007; Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). Moreover, the 
costlier the threat, the harder it is to accept the threat—and such acceptance may be essential for 
terminating repetitive thinking (Berenbaum, 2010). Huang and Berenbaum (2018a) hypothesized 
that self-insecurity leads to increased perceived costs of threats, which in turn leads to increased 
repetitive thinking (i.e., perceived costs of threats mediates the link between self-security and 
repetitive thinking. 
It is worthwhile to clarify the similarities and differences between perceived cost and 
perceived self-evaluation relevance. They are both facets of threat perception, and threats 
perceived as high-cost tend to also be perceived as highly relevant to self-evaluation. However, 
some threats could be highly relevant to self-evaluation but low-cost (e.g., getting called 
“Loser!” by a passerby), whereas some threats could be irrelevant to self-evaluation but high-
cost (e.g., getting hit by a drunk driver). I therefore propose that the two constructs are related 
but distinct, and it is important to study how each is associated with repetitive thinking. 
In the present study, we proposed a third potential mediator of self-insecurity’s link with 





(Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993). Although no research that we know documents an 
association between discomfort with ambiguity and repetitive thinking, empirical evidence is 
consistent with our proposal that it contributes to repetitive thinking: a closely related construct, 
intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004), is associated with repetitive 
thinking (Berenbaum, Bredemeier, Thompson, 2008). We believe that exploring discomfort with 
ambiguity as a potential mediator, instead of exploring intolerance of uncertainty, has two 
advantages. First, whereas intolerance of uncertainty focuses on uncertainty about the future, 
discomfort with ambiguity has no temporal orientation and, thus, suits research on repetitive 
thinking—about the past, the present, or the future. Second, whereas intolerance of uncertainty 
concerns one’s not knowing what will happen in the future, discomfort with ambiguity concerns 
how one interprets threats and, thus, suits research related to self-evaluation. We hypothesize that 
self-insecurity leads to increased discomfort with ambiguity, which in turn leads to increased 
repetitive thinking (i.e., discomfort with ambiguity mediates the link between self-security and 
repetitive thinking. 
In sum, the present study focused on self-insecurity’s link with unpleasant repetitive 
thinking. We had three goals. The first was to replicate self-insecurity’s association with 
repetitive thinking at the between-individuals level (using self- and close-others-reports of 
repetitive thinking) and at the within-individual level (using daily diaries). The second goal was 
to begin to investigate, at both the between-individuals and the within-individual levels, three 
proposed mediators of self-(in)security’s association with repetitive thinking: the perceived self-
evaluation relevance of threats, the perceived cost of threats, and discomfort with ambiguity. The 
third goal was to begin to investigate the role of subjective experience of stress. Specifically, we 





would be associated with subjective experience of stress; and (b) self-(in)security would remain 
associated with repetitive thinking even after accounting for subjective experience of stress. We 
did not explore the role of subjective experience of stress in either mediating or moderating self-
(in)security’s link with repetitive thinking. 
Besides repetitive thinking, we also sought to replicate self-insecurity’s association with 
anhedonic depression, the facet of depression not shared with anxiety (Watson & Clark, 1991), 
and to begin to investigate self-insecurity’s association with externalizing psychopathology. 
Specifically, we tested whether self-insecurity was associated with several alcohol variables: 
whether people drank, how many standard drinks, and how severe the alcohol problems. 
To render less plausible the alternative explanation that self-insecurity’s shared variance 
with self-esteem or neuroticism/negative affect (NA) drove self-insecurity’s associations with 
repetitive thinking, with depression, or with alcohol problems, we accounted for self-esteem or 
neuroticism/NA when testing our hypotheses, and examined how much the associations’ 
strengths changed (if at all). Lastly, for comparison, we examined self-esteem’s associations with 
repetitive thinking, depression, and alcohol problems. 
 
Method 
Participants and Their Close Others 
 Participants were 280 undergraduates (68.2% female), ranging in age from 18 to 30 (M = 
18.9, SD = 1.2). Racially, the majority (58.6%) identified as White, followed by 23.6% Asian, 
7.1% Black/African American, and 10.7% multiracial or other; ethnically, 12.5% identified as 
Latino/Hispanic. Participants provided written informed consent and received credit toward 





Each participant was asked to invite, by electronically messaging a brief description of 
our study and a link to an online survey, up to five “people who know you the best.” These close 
others could be family, friends, or romantic partners. They must have been at least eighteen years 
old, had known the participant for at least six months, and had internet access, to be eligible to 
provide confidential and independent reports of the participant’ trait unpleasant repetitive 
thinking. Specifically, 248 (88.6%) participants invited their close others. Six hundred and 
ninety-nine close others (Mage = 32.6; 63.7% female) completed the surveys, providing data for 
226 participants (80.7% of the entire sample). The majority were parents (35.8%), followed by 
friends (32.0%), siblings (11.9%), romantic partners (5.0%), other relatives (3.9%), and others 
(11.4%; e.g., roommates). 
Procedure 
 Participants completed trait assessments individually in a 20-minute lab session and 
received instructions to complete at least six (and preferably seven) daily diaries. We emailed 
them daily at 8 p.m. links to identical diaries for seven consecutive days; they had until 4 a.m. to 
complete diaries. We dropped participants (stopped emailing them links) as soon as they missed 
two diaries and lost eligibility for research compensation; these 45 participants did not differ 
significantly from the other participants on any variable (e.g., demographic variables).  
Materials 
Trait Assessments 
  Self-(In)Security. We used the 13-item (e.g., “My weaknesses make me feel like there’s 
something wrong with me”; α = .91) Security of "I" Assessment (SofIA; Huang & Berenbaum, 
2017), which measures how much one accepts (or rejects) one’s weaknesses. Response options 





security. Following Huang and Berenbaum (2017), before completing the SofIA, participants 
completed exercises to help them identify and think deeply about their weaknesses. Specifically, 
they: (a) read about the researchers’ definition of weaknesses and examples of weaknesses; (b) 
identified two of their own major weaknesses; and (c) answered open-ended questions about 
their weaknesses (for additional details, see Huang & Berenbaum, 2017). 
Self-Esteem. We used the 10-item (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”; α 
= .90) Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Response options range from 1 (strongly 
agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). Higher scores indicate higher self-esteem. 
Neuroticism/Trait Negative Affectivity. We used the 8-item (e.g., “Gets nervous 
easily”; α = .83) subscale of the Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999), which measures 
emotional instability and the tendency to experience unpleasant affect. Response options range 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate higher neuroticism. 
Extroversion. We used the 8-item (e.g., “Generates a lot of enthusiasm”; α = .87) 
subscale of the Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999), which measures interpersonal 
assertiveness and the tendency to actively engage in and enjoy social activities. Response options 
range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate higher 
extroversion. 
Perceived Cost and Perceived Self-Evaluation Relevance of Threats 
To measure perceived cost and perceived self-evaluation relevance, we presented participants 
with 26 everyday undesirable outcomes that they might think repetitively about (e.g., “losing a 
friendship,” “making a mistake during an interview”). Following past research on unpleasant 
repetitive thinking (Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007), these undesirable outcomes 





Perceived cost. Drawing on past research on perceived cost of threats (e.g., Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; Butler & Mathews, 1983), participants rated “how bad” each of 
the above 26 undesirable outcomes was. Response options range from 1 (not at all bad) to 6 
(extremely bad). We averaged the items (α = .90) to form a perceived cost score. Higher scores 
indicate more perceived cost. 
Perceived self-evaluation relevance. Because no instrument that we know of measures 
perceived self-evaluation relevance of threats, we developed our own. Participants rated each of 
the above 26 undesirable outcomes in terms of “how much it reflected the kind of person you 
are, or say something about how much you're worth as a person.” Response options range from 1 
(unrelated to my identity/worth) to 6 (completely defines my identity/worth). We averaged the 
items (α = .94) to form a perceived self-evaluation relevance score. Higher scores indicate more 
perceived self-evaluation relevance. 
Discomfort with ambiguity. We used the 9-item (e.g., “I don’t like situations that are 
uncertain”; α = .80) subscale of the Need for Closure Scale (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 
1993). Response options range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores 
indicate more discomfort with ambiguity. 
Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking. We used the 12-item (e.g., “Often I'm playing back 
over in my mind how I acted in a past situation”; α = .92) rumination subscale of the 
Rumination–Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) and the 16-item (e.g., 
“I am always worrying about something”; α = .93) Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Response options range from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree) for the RRQ and from 1 (not at all typical) to 5 (very typical) for the 





them to form a composite repetitive thinking score. Higher scores indicate more repetitive 
thinking. 
Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking: Reports From Close Others 
 The close others completed the 8-item (α = .95) Penn State Worry Questionnaire-
Abbreviated (PSWQ-A; Hopko, 2003). Crittendon and Hopko (2006) found that this scale has 
good psychometric properties in a sample of younger adults. The close others also completed a 
subset of the RRQ, because no shortened version of the RRQ that we know of has been 
developed. Specifically, we selected six RRQ items (α = .84) based on our consensus judgment 
after considering corrected item-total correlations. We modified the six items and the instructions 
to ask about the participants’—not the close others’—repetitive thinking (e.g., “They often find 
themselves re-evaluating something they've done” instead of “I often find myself re-evaluating 
something I've done”). The items were: (1) They tend to "ruminate" or dwell over things that 
happen to them for a really long time afterward; (2) They spend a great deal of time thinking 
back over their embarrassing or disappointing moments; (3) They often reflect on episodes in 
their life that they should no longer concern themselves with; (4) Long after an argument or 
disagreement is over with, their thoughts keep going back to what happened; (5) They never 
ruminate or dwell on themselves for very long (reverse-scored); and (6) They often find 
themselves re-evaluating something they've done. 
The standardized RRQ & PSWQ scores were strongly correlated (r = .68); we averaged 
them to form a composite repetitive thinking score. For participants with two or more close-
others reports (n = 169), we averaged the repetitive thinking scores across each participant’s 
close others. Participants with close-others reports did not significantly differ on any variable 





Anhedonic depression. We used the 7-item version (e.g., “felt like nothing was very 
enjoyable”; α = .87; the item about suicidal thoughts was omitted due to IRB concerns) of the 
22-item anhedonic depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire 
(Watson, Weber, Assenheimer, Clark, Strauss, & McCormick, 1995), because the shortened 
version predicts current depressive disorder better than the full subscale (Bredemeier et al., 
2010). The instructions asked about anhedonic depression during the past month. Response 
options range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Higher scores indicate more anhedonic 
depression. Because this variable is not the focus of the present study, to keep the diaries 
reasonably brief, we did not assess daily anhedonic depression. 
Alcohol Use. Participants answered the question, “Did you drink alcohol in the past 
month?” (no = 0; yes = 1). Participants who indicated yes completed the following alcohol 
assessments. 
Standard drinks consumed. We provided participants with the definition of standard 
drinks, “1 standard drink = a 12oz can of beer, a 5oz glass of wine, or a 1.5oz shot of hard 
liquor.” We then assessed the number of standard drinks they consumed using two items: (1) 
How frequently did you drink alcohol? (once in the past month to 6 or 7 days a week on a six-
point scale); and (2) Remember the days in the past month when you drank. About how many 
standard drinks did you have per day? (less than 1 standard drink to 15 or more standard drinks 
on an eight-point scale). The two items were strongly correlated (r = .43). We used their 
responses to estimate the number of drinks consumed in the past month (e.g., multiplying “once 
in the past month” by “15 or more standard drinks” and yielding 15 standard drinks). 
Alcohol problems. We used the 15-item (e.g., “I have failed to do what is expected of me 





Morgan, Labouvie, & Bux, 2003). Response options range from 1 (never or not at all) to 4 (daily 
or almost daily or very much); for the item “I have had an accident while drinking or 
intoxicated,” response options range from 1 (no) to 4 (yes, more than once). We modified the 
instructions to ask about alcohol problems experienced in the past month. Higher scores indicate 
more alcohol problems. 
Daily Assessments 
 Self-(In)Security. We used a shortened, five-item version of the SofIA (αs, measured 
separately for each day, ranged from .94 to .96). We selected the five items because, in a 
previous study (N = 195): (a) they had the highest item-total correlations; (b) they were 
internally consistent (α = .84); and (c) the shortened version of the SofIA formed by these five 
items was very strongly correlated (r = .95) with the original, full-length version. We modified 
these five items and the instructions to ask about how much participants accepted (or rejected) 
their weaknesses on that particular day. The items were: (1) Today, my weaknesses made me 
feel like there’s something wrong with me; (2) My weaknesses made life less enjoyable today; 
(3) Because of my weaknesses, I found it hard to like myself today; (4) Because of my 
weaknesses, I found it hard to respect myself today; and (5) My weaknesses bothered me today. 
 Self-Esteem. We used a shortened, five-item version of the RSE (αs, measured separately 
for each day, ranged from .86 to .89). We selected the five items because, in a previous study (N 
= 195): (a) they had the highest item-total correlations; (b) they were internally consistent (α 
= .83); and (c) the shortened version of the RSE formed by these five items was very strongly 
correlated (r = .91) with the original, full-length version. We modified these five items and the 
instructions to ask about how participants felt about themselves overall on that particular day. 





times today; (3) I wish I had more respect for myself today; (4) All in all, I am inclined to feel 
that I was a failure today; and (5) I took a positive attitude toward myself today. 
 Negative Affect. We used five items (e.g., “distressed”) from the NA subscale of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and, because the 
subscale measures “only the high activation end points” (Larsen & Diener, 1992, p. 29), we 
added three lower arousal items (e.g., “sad”), following previous research (e.g., Manjrekar & 
Berenbaum, 2012). The resulting 8-item scale’s αs, measured separately for each day, ranged 
from .89 to .93. The instructions asked about NA experienced on that particular day. Response 
options range from 1 (slightly or not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
 Subjective experience of stress. We assessed subjective experience of stress using two 
items: (1) Overall, how stressed did you feel today? (not at all to extremely on a six-point scale); 
and (2) Event(s) today caused me a lot of stress (strongly agree to strongly disagree on a seven-
point scale). We averaged the items to form a subjective experience of stress scale (αs, measured 
separately for each day, range from .77 to .85).
13
 Higher scores indicate greater subjective 
experience of stress. 
Perceived cost. Because no instrument that we know of measures daily perceived cost of 
undesired outcomes, we developed our own. Participants first identified undesired outcomes by 
listing “the unpleasant things you thought about the most today.” They then rated “how bad,” 
overall, the undesired outcomes were. Response options range from 1 (not at all bad) to 6 
(extremely bad). 
 Perceived self-evaluation relevance. Because no instrument that we know of measures 
daily perceived self-evaluation relevance of undesired outcomes, we developed our own. 
                                                 
13
 The correlations between subjective experience of stress and daily NA (measured separately for each day) ranged 





Participants rated how much, overall, the above undesired outcomes “reflected the kind of person 
you are, or say something about how much you're worth as a person.” Response options range 
from 1 (unrelated to my identity/worth) to 6 (completely defined my identity/worth). 
 Discomfort with ambiguity. Because no instrument that we know of measures daily 
discomfort with ambiguity, we developed our own. Using the trait assessment as a guide, we 
wrote the following item: “Sometimes we feel uncomfortable about the way things are uncertain. 
We might feel upset because we don’t understand the causes of unpleasant events, or because we 
are confused about issues important to us. Sometimes we dislike not knowing other people’s 
intentions, thoughts, and feelings, or not knowing how to interpret things that other people said.” 
Participants rated how much this statement applied to their concerns today; response options 
range from 1 (not at all applicable) to 7 (completely applicable). Additionally, participants 
responded to the item, “I felt uncomfortable with the uncertainty/ambiguity involved in today's 
concerns”; response options range from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). We averaged 
the two items (rs, measured separately for each day, range from .30 to .59) to form a discomfort 
with ambiguity score. 
 Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking. We used the instrument developed in Huang and 
Berenbaum (2018) to measure daily repetitive thinking. Participants responded to the following 
items about their concerns: (1) How much did these concerns, overall, bother you today? (2) 
How difficult was it to try to stop thinking about these concerns, overall, today? (3) Estimate 
how much time in total you thought about these concerns, overall, today. Response options range 
from 1 (not at all; for item #3, less than 5 minutes) to 6 (extremely; for item #3, more than 2 
hours). We averaged the items to form a repetitive thinking score (αs, measured separately for 





Alcohol Use. Participants answered the question, “Did you drink alcohol today?” (no = 0; 
yes = 1). Response options range from 0 (no) to 1 (yes). Participants who indicated yes 
completed the assessment for standard drinks consumed. 
Standard drinks consumed. Participants reviewed the definition of standard drinks and 
answered the question, “About how many standard drinks did you have today?” Response 




Is Self-(In)Security Associated With Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking? 
Between-Individuals Analyses 
 We began by using the trait assessments to explore, at the between-individuals level, 
whether self-(in)security was associated repetitive thinking. We then tested whether the 
association would remain after accounting for neuroticism or self-esteem. To do so, we 
computed partial correlations, removing the variance shared with neuroticism or self-esteem. 
Additionally, we tested whether self-(in)security would continue to be associated with repetitive 
thinking after simultaneously accounting for neuroticism and self-esteem. To do so, we 
computed the partial correlation, removing the variance shared with neuroticism and self-esteem. 
We conducted similar analyses for self-esteem. 
We present the results for self-reported repetitive thinking in the upper half of Table 4.1; 
the lower half shows the results for close-others-reported repetitive thinking. As the upper half 
shows, the present study replicated previous findings (Huang & Berenbaum, 2018a; Huang & 





thinking—and continued to be associated with it even after accounting for: (a) neuroticism alone; 
(b) self-esteem alone; and (c) both neuroticism and self-esteem simultaneously. Self-esteem was 
also strongly associated with self-reported repetitive thinking—and continued to be associated 
with it even after accounting for self-(in)security alone. However, self-esteem was no longer 
associated with self-reported repetitive thinking after accounting for neuroticism alone (or both 
neuroticism and self-(in)security simultaneously). As the lower half of Table 4.1 shows, self-
(in)security was associated with close-others-reported repetitive thinking. However, the 
association was no longer significant after accounting for neuroticism or self-esteem. Similarly, 
self-esteem was associated with close-others-reported repetitive thinking, but not after 






Between-Individuals Correlations Between Aspects of Self-Evaluation and Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking 
 Self-(In)Security Self-Esteem 
Zero-order correlations with repetitive thinking: self-reported -.53*** -.46*** 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism -.25*** -.09 
Partial correlations accounting for self-esteem -.32***  
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-esteem -.24***  
Partial correlations accounting for self-(in)security  -.15** 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-(in)security  .07 
Zero-order correlations with repetitive thinking: close-others-reported -.20** -.20** 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism -.02 -.01 
Partial correlations accounting for self-esteem -.09  
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-esteem -.02  
Partial correlations accounting for self-(in)security  -.09 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-(in)security  .01 







 Next, using the daily assessments, we examined, at the within-individual level, whether 
self-(in)security was associated with repetitive thinking. To do so, we used the MIXED 
procedure of the SAS 9.4 software to conduct multilevel modeling with maximum likelihood 
estimation. We specified repetitive thinking as the outcome variable in each model, included 
random intercepts, and used unstructured covariance structures and unstandardized coefficients 
(for model equations and SAS code, see Appendix). To focus on within-individual variance, we 
centered predictor variables on each individual’s own mean, as recommended by Enders and 
Tofighi (2007; e.g., for self-(in)security, we subtracted the mean of all daily self-(in)security 
scores of a particular individual from every daily self-(in)security score of that individual). We 
conducted similar analyses for self-esteem. 
As can be seen in Table 4.2, the present study replicated previous findings (Huang & 
Berenbaum, 2018a): self-(in)security was associated with repetitive thinking at the within-
individual level (Model #1)—and continued to be associated with it even after accounting for: (a) 
NA alone (Model #2); (b) self-esteem alone (Model #5); and (c) NA and self-esteem 
simultaneously (Model #6). Similarly, self-esteem was associated with repetitive thinking 
(Model #3), and continued to be so even after accounting for: (a) NA alone (Model #4); (b) self-







Within-Individual Coefficient Estimates for  
Aspects of Self-Evaluation Predicting Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking 
Predicting repetitive thinking Estimate SE df t 
Model #1     
Self-(in)security -.41*** .02 1476 -21.05 
Model #2     
NA .79*** .03 1474 22.98 
Self-(in)security -.18*** .02 1474 -8.97 
Model #3     
Self-esteem -.51*** .03 1473 -19.84 
Model #4     
NA .82*** .04 1472 22.96 
Self-esteem -.17*** .03 1472 -6.41 
Model #5     
Self-esteem -.30*** .03 1473 -10.10 
Self-(in)security -.28*** .02 1473 -12.02 
Model #6     
NA .75*** .04 1472 20.24 
Self-esteem -.09** .03 1472 -3.14 
Self-(in)security -.15*** .02 1472 -7.03 
 
Note. NA = negative affect. Predictors are Level 1 and, to focus on 
within-individual variance, centered on each individual’s own mean. 
Models include random intercepts; see Appendix for equations and SAS 
code. Coefficients are unstandardized. 






Perceived Self-Evaluation Relevance, Perceived Cost, and Discomfort With Ambiguity: Do They 
Mediate Self-(In)Security’s Association With Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking? 
Between-Individuals Analyses 
Before testing our hypotheses about mediation, we examined self-(in)security’s 
correlations with the proposed mediators. As can be seen in Table 4.3, self-(in)security was 
substantially correlated in the expected directions with the perceived cost of threats, the 
perceived self-evaluation relevance of threats, and discomfort with ambiguity. Self-esteem was 
also substantially correlated with perceived cost and self-relevance, but only weakly correlated 
with discomfort with ambiguity. We then examined the proposed mediators’ correlations with 
repetitive thinking. All the proposed mediators were substantially correlated in the expected 







Between-Individuals Correlations Between Aspects of Self-Evaluation, Neuroticism, Proposed 
Mediators, and Unpleasant Repetitive Thinking 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       1. Self-(in)security 3.4 1.2 —      
       2. Self-esteem 2.9 .6 .71
***
 —     
       3. Perceived self-evaluation 






—    
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 —  
       6. Repetitive thinking,  












       7. Repetitive thinking, 











*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Next, we tested our hypotheses that the proposed factors mediated self-(in)security’s 
association with repetitive thinking. To do so, we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 
2013). This macro estimates mediation parameters and significance levels. We used 
bootstrapping with 5000 resamples to obtain 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals (CIs) of the 
indirect effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable. If the CI does not include zero, 
then the indirect (mediated) effect is significantly different from zero. 
We first tested each proposed factor separately using self-reported repetitive thinking. As 
can be seen in the upper rows of Table 4.4, all three factors mediated self-(in)security’s 
association with repetitive thinking, as expected. Next, we tested whether the proposed factors 
would continue to mediate the association when all three of them were entered simultaneously 
(multiple mediator analysis). As can be seen in the middle rows of Table 4.4, when entered 
simultaneously, only the perceived cost of threats and discomfort with ambiguity continued to 
mediate self-(in)security’s association with repetitive thinking; the CI for perceived self-
evaluation relevance included zero, suggesting that it did not mediate the association. We 





mediated self-esteem’s association with repetitive thinking. When entered simultaneously, only 
the perceived cost of threats and discomfort with ambiguity continued to mediate self-esteem’s 
association with repetitive thinking. 
Next, we tested each proposed mediator separately using close-others-reported repetitive 
thinking. As can be seen in the lower rows of Table 4.4, none of the proposed factors mediated 
self-(in)security’s association with repetitive thinking; all their CIs included zero. The results for 








Between-Individual Indirect Effects for Proposed Mediators of 
















For self-reported repetitive thinking 
Mediators entered separately 
Perceived cost -.08* .02 [-.14, -.04] -.08* .02 [-.14, -.04] 
Perceived self-evaluation relevance -.05* .02 [-.09, -.02] -.06* .02 [-.11, -.01] 
Discomfort with ambiguity -.06* .02 [-.11, -.03] -.04* .02 [-.08, -.01] 
Mediators entered simultaneously (multiple mediator analysis) 
Total Effects -.13* .03 [-.19, -.08] -.10* .03 [-.16, -.04] 
Perceived cost -.06* .03 [-.12, -.02] -.07* .02 [-.12, -.03] 
Perceived self-evaluation relevance -.01 .02 [-.06, .02] .00 .02 [-.05, .05] 
Discomfort with ambiguity -.05* .02 [-.09, -.02] -.03* .02 [-.06, -.00] 
For close-others-reported repetitive thinking 
Mediators entered separately 
Perceived cost -.01 .03 [-.06, .04] -.01 .02 [-.05, .03] 
Perceived self-evaluation relevance -.02 .02 [-.07, .02] -.02 .03 [-.08, .03] 
Discomfort with ambiguity -.03 .02 [-.08, .01] -.02 .01 [-.05, .00] 







Before testing our hypotheses about mediation, we examined self-(in)security’s 
associations with the proposed mediators (for model equations and SAS code, see Appendix). 
Self-(in)security was associated in the expected directions with the perceived self-evaluation 
relevance of threats (coefficient estimate = -.30, SE = .02, t(1464) = -14.86, p < .001), the 
perceived cost of threats (coefficient estimate = -.24, SE = .02, t(1464) = -10.13, p < .001), and 
discomfort with ambiguity (coefficient estimate = -.03, SE = .003, t(1475) = -8.61, p < .001). 
Similarly, self-esteem was associated with the perceived self-evaluation relevance of threats 
(coefficient estimate = -.38, SE = .03, t(1461) = -14.72, p < .001), the perceived cost of threats 
(coefficient estimate = -.33, SE = .03, t(1462) = -10.79, p < .001), and discomfort with ambiguity 
(coefficient estimate = -.04, SE = .005, t(1473) = -8.15, p < .001). We then examined the 
proposed mediators’ associations with repetitive thinking (for model equations and SAS code, 
see Appendix). The perceived self-evaluation relevance of threats (coefficient estimate = .46, SE 
= .02, t(1462) = 18.84, p < .001), the perceived cost of threats (coefficient estimate = .48, SE 
= .02, t(1464) = 24.29, p < .001), and discomfort with ambiguity (coefficient estimate = 2.43, SE 
= .15, t(1474) = 16.62, p < .001) were all associated in the expected directions with repetitive 
thinking. 
Next, we tested our hypotheses that the proposed factors mediated self-(in)security’s 
association with repetitive thinking. To do so, we used the MLmed macro for SPSS for 
multilevel mediation (Rockwood & Hayes, 2017). We estimated the indirect effects using a 
Monte Carlo simulation generating 95% CIs using 10,000 resamples. We first tested each 
proposed mediator separately. As can be seen in the top half of Table 4.5, all three factors 





whether the proposed factors would continue to mediate the association when all three of them 
were entered simultaneously (multiple mediator analysis). As can be seen in the bottom half of 
Table 4.5, all three factors continued to mediate self-(in)security’s association with repetitive 
thinking. We conducted similar analyses for self-esteem, and the results were similar. Each of 
the three factors mediated self-esteem’s association with repetitive thinking, and continued to 







Within-Individual Indirect Effects for Proposed Mediators of 




B SE Z 95% CI B SE Z 95% CI 
Mediators entered separately 
Perceived self-evaluation relevance -.10*** .01 -9.87 [-.11, -.08] -.25*** .03 -9.97 [-.30, -.21] 
Perceived cost -.10*** .01 -9.14 [-.12, -.08] -.26*** .03 -9.57 [-.32, -.21] 
Discomfort with ambiguity -.06*** .01 -7.31 [-.07, -.04] -.15*** .02 -7.06 [-.19, -.11] 
Mediators entered simultaneously (multiple mediator analysis) 
Perceived self-evaluation relevance -.05*** .01 -6.64 [-.07, -.04] -.14*** .02 -6.95 [-.18, -.10] 
Perceived cost -.07*** .01 -8.46 [-.09, -.06] -.20*** .02 -8.77 [-.24, -.16] 
Discomfort with ambiguity -.03*** .01 -6.11 [-.05, -.02] -.09*** .01 -6.02 [-.12, -.06] 






What is the Role of Subjective Experience of Stress? 
Within-Individual Analyses 
 Next, using the daily assessments, we examined the role of subjective experience of 
stress at the within-individual level. We began by testing whether self-(in)security would be 
associated with subjective experience of stress. To do so, we conducted multilevel modeling with 
maximum likelihood estimation. We specified subjective experience of stress as the outcome 
variable in each model, centered predictor variables on each individual’s own mean, included 
random intercepts, and used unstructured covariance structures and unstandardized coefficients 
(for model equations and SAS code, see Appendix). We conducted similar analyses for self-
esteem. 
As can be seen in Table 4.6, self-(in)security was associated with subjective experience 
of stress (Model #1), and continued to be associated with it even after accounting for: (a) NA 
alone (Model #2); self-esteem alone (Model #5); and (c) NA and self-esteem simultaneously 
(Model #6). Similarly, self-esteem was associated with subjective experience of stress (Model 
#3), and continued to be associated with it even after accounting for: (a) NA alone (Model #4); 






Within-Individual Coefficient Estimates for  
Aspects of Self-Evaluation Predicting Subjective Experience of Stress 
Predicting subjective experience of stress Estimate SE df t 
Model #1     
Self-(in)security -.08*** .004 1477 -21.42 
Model #2     
NA .15*** .01 1475 20.45 
Self-(in)security -.04*** .004 1475 -10.04 
Model #3     
Self-esteem -.10*** .01 1473 -19.60 
Model #4     
NA .15*** .01 1472 20.74 
Self-esteem -.04*** .01 1472 -6.95 
Model #5     
Self-esteem -.06*** .01 1473 -9.63 
Self-(in)security -.06*** .01 1473 -12.63 
Model #6     
NA .14*** .01 1472 17.89 
Self-esteem -.02** .01 1472 -3.27 
Self-(in)security -.04*** .004 1472 -8.05 
 
Note. NA = negative affect. Predictors are Level 1 and, to focus on within-individual 
variance, centered on each individual’s own mean. Models include random intercepts; 
see Appendix for equations and SAS code. Coefficients are unstandardized. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 





Next, we tested whether self-(in)security would remain associated with repetitive 
thinking even after accounting for subjective experience of stress. To do so, we tested a model, 
with repetitive thinking as the outcome variable, that included self-(in)security and subjective 
experience of stress (for model equations and SAS code, see Appendix). As expected, self-
(in)security continued to be associated with repetitive thinking even after accounting for 
subjective experience of stress (coefficient estimate = -.20, SE = .02, t(1475) = -10.18, p < .001). 
We conducted a similar analysis for self-esteem, which also continued to be associated with 
repetitive thinking even after accounting for subjective experience of stress (coefficient estimate 
= -.24, SE = .02, t(1473) = -9.91, p < .001). 
 
Is Self-(In)Security Associated With Anhedonic Depression? 
Between-Individuals Analyses 
 We used the trait assessments to explore, at the between-individuals level, self-
(in)security’s association with anhedonic depression. We then tested whether the association 
would remain after accounting for neuroticism or self-esteem. To do so, we computed partial 
correlations, removing the variance shared with neuroticism or self-esteem. Additionally, we 
tested whether self-(in)security would continue to be associated with anhedonic depression after 
simultaneously accounting for neuroticism and self-esteem. To do so, we computed the partial 
correlation, removing the variance shared with neuroticism and self-esteem. We conducted 
similar analyses for self-esteem. 
As Table 4.7 shows, the present study replicated previous findings (Huang & Berenbaum, 
2018b): self-(in)security was strongly associated with anhedonic depression—and continued to 





(c) both neuroticism and self-esteem simultaneously. Similarly, self-esteem was also associated 
with anhedonic depression, even after accounting for: (a) neuroticism alone; (b) self-(in)security 
alone; and (c) both neuroticism and self-(in)security simultaneously. (As noted earlier, we did 







Between-Individuals Correlations Between Aspects of Self-Evaluation and Anhedonic Depression 
 Self-(In)Security Self-Esteem 
Zero-order correlations with anhedonic depression -.56*** -.67*** 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism -.42*** -.55*** 
Partial correlations accounting for self-esteem -.16**  
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-esteem -.13*  
Partial correlations accounting for self-(in)security  -.47*** 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-(in)security  -.42*** 





Is Self-(In)Security Associated With Alcohol Variables? 
Between-Individuals Analyses 
 We began by using the trait assessments to explore, at the between-individuals level, 
whether self-(in)security was associated with alcohol use in the past month. Next, for the 
participants who drank, we tested whether self-(in)security was associated with the number of 
standard drinks consumed or alcohol problems. We then tested whether any association found 
would remain after accounting for extroversion, neuroticism, or self-esteem. To do so, we 
computed partial correlations, removing the variance shared with extroversion, neuroticism, or 
self-esteem. We conducted similar analyses for self-esteem. 
The results show that the participants who drank in the past month did not differ in self-
(in)security from the participants who did not drink (t(268) = -.83, p = .41). For the participants 
who drank (n = 172, 61.4% of our sample), self-(in)security was not associated with the number 
of drinks consumed (r = -.03, p = .35). Similarly, self-esteem was not associated with alcohol use 
(t(268) = -1.80, p = .07) or the number of drinks consumed (r = .08, p = .14). 
However, as Table 4.8 shows, self-(in)security was associated with alcohol problems, as 
expected. Moreover, rejecting one’s own weaknesses continued to be associated with alcohol 
problems even after accounting for extroversion, but not after accounting for neuroticism or self-
esteem. Similarly, self-esteem was associated with alcohol problems, even after accounting for 







Between-Individuals Correlations Between Aspects of Self-Evaluation and Alcohol Problems 
 Self-(In)Security Self-Esteem 
Zero-order correlations with alcohol problems -.18** -.16* 
Partial correlations accounting for extroversion -.21** -.21** 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism -.10 -.06 
Partial correlations accounting for self-esteem -.10  
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-esteem -.08  
Partial correlations accounting for self-(in)security  -.06 
Partial correlations accounting for neuroticism & self-(in)security  -.01 






 Next, using the daily assessments, we examined, at the within-individual level, whether 
self-(in)security was associated with alcohol use; if the participant drank that day, then we tested 
whether self-(in)security was associated with the number of standard drinks consumed. To do so, 
we conducted multilevel modeling with maximum likelihood estimation. We specified either 
alcohol use or the number of drinks consumed as the outcome variable in each model, centered 
predictor variables on each individual’s own mean, included random intercepts, and used 
unstructured covariance structures and unstandardized coefficients (for model equations and SAS 
code, see Appendix). We conducted similar analyses for self-esteem. 
The results show that self-(in)security was not associated with alcohol use (coefficient 
estimate = .00, SE = .01, t(1474) = .05, p = .96). If the participant drank that day, self-(in)security 
was not associated with the number of drinks consumed (coefficient estimate = .16, SE = .32, 
t(115) = .49, p = .63). Similarly, self-esteem was not associated with either alcohol use 
(coefficient estimate = .01, SE = .01, t(1469) = .78, p = .44) or the number of drinks consumed 
(coefficient estimate = -.58, SE = .45, t(117) = -1.30, p = .20). 
 
Discussion 
The present study replicated self-insecurity’s association with repetitive thinking—above 
and beyond neuroticism/NA or self-esteem—at both the between-individuals and within-
individual levels. We also began to explore potential mediators of this association. The perceived 
cost of threats, the perceived self-evaluation relevance of threats, and discomfort with ambiguity 
each mediated self-insecurity’s association with repetitive thinking at both the between-





support our proposal that, because self-insecurity captures one’s “modus operandi” confronting 
threats (anything that makes one feel vulnerable), it is key to informing us about self-
evaluation’s influence on repetitive thinking—and perhaps by extension, on internalizing 
psychopathology. Second, these findings began to shed light on exactly how rejecting one’s 
weaknesses might increase repetitive thinking. Specifically, the findings are consistent with our 
hypothesis that self-insecurity increases threat perception—by having one take threats too 
personally, by making threats appear particularly intimidating, and by maintaining one’s 
hypervigilance against further threats. Although the findings are consistent with our theory, one 
limitation is that the present study is cross-sectional and therefore, could not directly test 
mediation. To more rigorously test our theory and further elucidate potential causal relations 
among self-insecurity, the proposed mediators, and repetitive thinking, future research should 
use longitudinal methods and true experiments (in which the researcher manipulates one variable 
to test its effect on another variable). 
The present study also expanded the research on self-insecurity’s link with repetitive 
thinking by exploring the role of subjective experience of stress. We found that: (a) self-
insecurity was associated with subjective experience of stress above and beyond NA and self-
esteem; and (b) self-insecurity continued to be associated with repetitive thinking above and 
beyond subjective experience of stress. Extensive research (e.g., Hankin et al., 2015; Hankin, 
Mermelstein, & Roesch, 2007; Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999) suggests that an important 
contributor to psychopathology is the occurrence of stressors (which includes major and minor 
acute life events, chronic stressors, and daily hassles; Harkness & Monroe, 2016). Subjective 
experience of stress is different from the occurrence of stressors: occurrence of the same stressor 





shortcoming of the present study is that it did not assess the occurrence of stressors. Future 
research on self-(in)security’s links with various psychopathology should investigate potential 
interactions with the occurrence of stressors (assessed via ratings of events by trained 
interviewers/coders). 
The present study addressed a limitation of past research, relying solely on self-reports, 
by incorporating close-others-reports of repetitive thinking. Self-insecurity was associated with 
close-others-reported repetitive thinking, like it was with self-reported repetitive thinking. 
However, unlike in self-reports, in close-others-reports this association was no longer significant 
after accounting for neuroticism or self-esteem, and was not mediated by any of the proposed 
factors. There are at least two possible explanations for these discrepant results. One is that the 
close-others-reports failed to assess repetitive thinking adequately. For example, research shows 
substantial discrepancy among informant ratings of internalizing problems and potential 
underreporting (van der Ende, Verhulst, & Tiemeier, 2012). Perhaps close others could only 
observe—and report—repetitive thinking of the participants who chose to confide in close 
others. If this was the case, then close-other-reported repetitive thinking was misleading, and 
self-reported repetitive thinking had higher validity. Another possible explanation for the 
discrepant results between close-others-reported versus self-reported repetitive thinking is that 
the common method bias inflated self-insecurity’s association with repetitive thinking, because 
both variables were assessed via self-reports. If this was the case, then self-insecurity might not, 
as we believe, have true incremental predictive utility for repetitive thinking above and beyond 
self-esteem or neuroticism. No matter which case was true, to better assess self-insecurity and/or 





momentary assessment, interviews with participants, behavioral laboratory tasks, qualitative 
methods). 
The present study also examined self-insecurity’s links with variables beyond repetitive 
thinking. Specifically, we replicated self-insecurity’s association with anhedonic depression 
above and beyond neuroticism or self-esteem, providing additional evidence consistent with 
Huang and Berenbaum’s theory that self-insecurity contributes to depression (2018b). To render 
less plausible the alternative explanation that individual differences in another variable drove 
self-insecurity’s association with depression, we recommend that future research examine this 
association simultaneously at the between-individuals and the within-individual levels by, for 
example, complementing cross-sectional methods with daily diary methods. Additionally, we 
found that although self-insecurity was not associated with whether participants drank or how 
much they drank, self-insecurity was associated with alcohol problems above and beyond 
extroversion. These findings are important for two reasons. First, they suggest that self-insecurity 
is linked with, specifically, problematic behaviors (instead of, e.g., non-problematic drinking). 
Second, these findings provide the first piece of evidence consistent with our proposal that self-
insecurity might be a risk factor for not only internalizing, but also externalizing, 
psychopathology. We recommend that future research investigate self-insecurity’s role in the 
development/course of clinically significant levels of substance use problems—and to continue 
to explore self-insecurity’s link with new variables related to externalizing psychopathology. 
All in all, the present study’s findings provide new evidence that rejecting one’s own 
weaknesses compromises wellbeing. We recommend that future research not only continue to 
investigate self-insecurity as a transdiagnostic risk factor for a broad range of psychopathology, 





and culture, because these variables influence how self-evaluation is associated with emotional 
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Across the three studies in my dissertation, I found that the rejection of one’s own 
weaknesses is associated with a wide variety of variables relevant to emotional 
wellbeing/psychopathology. Importantly, many of these associations remained significant even 
after accounting for self-esteem or neuroticism/NA. These findings support my proposal that 
self-insecurity is an aspect of self-evaluation crucially implicated in wellbeing/psychopathology. 
Self-insecurity’s link with repetitive thinking, an important transdiagnostic process in 
internalizing psychopathology, appears especially robust: I replicated this link across multiple 
studies at both the between-individuals and within-individual levels. Additionally, that self-
insecurity prospectively predicted increased repetitive thinking (Study #2) was an important 
piece of evidence supporting my theory that self-insecurity contributes to repetitive thinking. 
Future research should seek to replicate this finding using longer longitudinal methods and true 
experiments (in which the researcher manipulates self-insecurity to test its effect on repetitive 
thinking). 
Future research should also continue to elucidate the precise mechanism by which 
rejecting one’s own weaknesses may contribute to repetitive thinking. Several findings are 
consistent with my proposal that examining self-insecurity is key to understanding the link 
between maladaptive self-evaluation and repetitive thinking: that self-insecurity was more 
strongly associated with repetitive thinking when such thinking revolved around self-evaluation 
than when such thinking did not (Study #2), and that the perceived self-evaluation relevance of 





findings are also consistent with my theory that rejecting one’s weaknesses increases threat 
perception, which previous research suggests increases repetitive thinking (Borkovec, Alcaine, & 
Behar, 2004; Berenbaum, 2010). That the perceived cost of threats mediated self-insecurity’s 
association with repetitive thinking (Study #3) supports my theory that feeling compromised by 
one’s own weaknesses leads one to perceive threats as particularly intimidating. That discomfort 
with ambiguity mediated self-insecurity’s association with repetitive thinking (Study #3) 
supports my theory that self-insecurity leads to hypervigilance about potential undetected threats. 
I recommend that future research use true experiments to further explore potential causal 
relations between self-insecurity, factors related to threat perception (not limited to the three 
mediators I proposed), and repetitive thinking. 
Depression is another major focus in my studies. I found self-insecurity’s link with 
depression in several forms: robust association with lifetime MDD, replicated association with 
anhedonic depression, and prospective prediction of increases in MDD symptom severity and 
anhedonic depression. These findings, juxtaposed with the finding that lifetime MDD did not 
prospectively predict increases in self-insecurity, suggest that self-insecurity may contribute to 
depression. To further render less plausible the alternative explanation that some third variable 
drove the association, future research could examine self-insecurity’s association with depression 
simultaneously at the between-individuals and the within-individual levels (e.g., by 
complementing cross-sectional methods with daily diary methods). 
 Importantly, future research should test my theory that rejecting one’s own weaknesses 
potentiates cognitive vulnerability factors for depression. For example, to elucidate the precise 
mechanism by which self-insecurity may contribute to depression, future research should test 





include: negative self-schemas (Beck, 1967), which I propose self-insecurity feeds into; internal 
attributional style (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), because weaknesses are a subset of 
negative self-characteristics to which one might attribute the causes of unpleasant life events; 
and hopelessness, a proximal sufficient cause of depression symptoms (Abramson, Metalsky, & 
Alloy, 1989). 
All in all, my findings suggest that rejecting one’s own weaknesses may compromise 
wellbeing. I recommend the continued investigation of self-insecurity as a potential risk factor 
for a broad range of psychopathology—both internalizing and externalizing psychopathology, 
and beyond. For example, I theorize that self-insecurity predisposes people to post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) for two reasons. Rejecting weaknesses feeds into negative self-schemas, a 
cognitive vulnerability to PTSD (Feeny & Foa, 2005), and most people presumably deem 
traumatic experiences their weaknesses. A self-insecure person, then, should be more vulnerable 
to developing—after exposure to trauma—overly negative assumptions about oneself, and to 
avoid trauma-related thoughts, feelings, or reminders. Additionally, in light of self-insecurity’s 
link with pathological narcissistic traits (Huang & Berenbaum, 2017), it would be worthwhile to 
examine its link with clinically significant levels of narcissism. Similarly, given self-insecurity’s 
link with fear of negative evaluation, future research should examine its potential role in the 
development/course of avoidant personality disorder, as well as other personality disorders in 
which maladaptive self-evaluation plays a major role (e.g., borderline personality disorder). 
It will be important for future research to examine self-insecurity in diverse populations 
varying in age, education, socioeconomic status, and, especially, culture. Self-evaluation’s link 
with emotional wellbeing/psychopathology appears to be influenced by, for example, 





Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Because studies on self-insecurity have been limited to 
quite individualist samples (college students in the United States), future research should 
investigate this aspect of self-evaluation in collectivist samples. I hypothesize that: (a) people in 
collectivist cultures would be more self-insecure than people in individualist cultures, and (b) 
culture would influence self-insecurity’s associations with variables related to emotional 
wellbeing/psychopathology, such that the associations will be stronger in collectivist cultures 
than in individualist cultures. In collectivist cultures, other people’s evaluation of oneself matters 
more than it does in individualist cultures. Whereas a self-insecure person in an individualist 
culture must suffer their own rejection of their weaknesses, a self-insecure person in a 
collectivist culture must additionally suffer both the actual and anticipated rejection of their 
weaknesses by other people. In collectivist cultures, weaknesses have higher stakes, and the 
emotional costs of rejecting them is compounded by the costs of social rejection.  
Future research should also seek to improve the assessment of self-insecurity. The 
current—and only—method of assessment, the SofIA, has several limitations related to being a 
self-report. For example, although one strength of the SofIA is that it allows participants to 
pinpoint their “two biggest weaknesses,” which presumably allows participants to accurately 
gauge how accepting or rejecting they are about their “weaknesses in general,” this procedure 
has at least two disadvantages. First, it is possible that some participants fail to identify their 
major weaknesses; perhaps they honestly are not aware of them. In this case, the participants 
might instead identify comparatively minor weaknesses and unintentionally under-report their 
level of rejection of weaknesses. Second, even if participants correctly identify all their 
weaknesses, they might not be aware of—and thus cannot accurately gauge—their level of 





to develop alternative methods to assess self-insecurity, such as by conducting structured 
interviews, qualitative analysis of written responses, or even behavioral observations that better 
probe, for example, what people think about their weaknesses, how much they “blame” their 
weaknesses for life’s vicissitudes, and how successful they are at accepting weaknesses. 
My last recommendation for future research requires thinking more deeply about what it 
means to be self-(in)secure. If someone is accepting of their own weaknesses, is it because they 
are accepting of own weaknesses—or could it be that their weaknesses are “objectively” easy to 
accept? For example, a person could be “theoretically” very rejecting of own weaknesses but 
happens to be a fortunate “golden boy”—someone without weaknesses that he or anyone else 
would consider major. However, if he, say, has a car accident and loses his legs, his “latent” self-
insecurity may “kick in” and, assuming that self-insecurity does make one vulnerable to a whole 
host of psychopathology, this person will suffer immeasurably. I call this latent capacity to 
accept/reject new weaknesses “self-(in)security proneness.” It is one’s readiness to accept/reject 
weaknesses—the construct captures the lens by which one perceives any and all, actual or 
potential, weaknesses. For some people, their levels of self-(in)security and self-(in)security 
proneness are similar; for others, such as the aforementioned golden boy, their levels differ 
drastically: they could be very self-secure but very self-insecure prone. I argue that future 
research should aim to tease apart self-(in)security and self-(in)security proneness, and propose 
that both self-(in)security and self-(in)security proneness may prove useful tools for identifying 







HLM Equations and SAS Code 
URT = Unpleasant repetitive thinking 
Is self-(in)security/self-esteem associated with unpleasant repetitive thinking? 
Table 2.2 Level 1 Level 2 
Model #1 Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Model #2 Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + β2j(Today’s NA)ij + 
rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
Model #3 Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Model #4 Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + β2j(Today’s NA)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
Model #5 Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + β2j(Today’s Self-
esteem)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
Model #6 Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + β2j(Today’s Self-
esteem)ij + β3j(Today’s NA)ij + rij 
 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
β3j = γ30 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SS_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID; 
Run; 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDC daily SS, NA'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SS_avg IDCDD_NA_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID; 
Run; 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SE_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 







title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDC daily SE, NA'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SE_avg IDCDD_NA_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID; 
Run; 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDC daily SS, SE'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SS_avg IDCDD_SE_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID; 
Run; 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDC daily SS, SE, NA'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SS_avg IDCDD_SE_avg IDCDD_NA_avg / solution DDFM= 
SATTERTHWAITE; 







Perceived Self-Evaluation Relevance, Perceived Cost, and Discomfort With Ambiguity: 
Is self-(in)security/self-esteem associated with them? 
Are they associated with unpleasant repetitive thinking? 
Level 1 Level 2 
Today’s Perceived self-evaluation relevanceij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s Perceived costij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s Discomfort with ambiguityij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s Perceived self-evaluation relevanceij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s Perceived costij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s Discomfort with ambiguityij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Perceived self-evaluation relevance)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Perceived cost)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Discomfort with ambiguity)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
 
title 'DD_RELEV, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_RELEV = IDCDD_SS_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_COST, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_COST = IDCDD_SS_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;   
Run; 
 
title 'DD_DISCcombo, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_DISCcombo = IDCDD_SS_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 







title 'DD_RELEV, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_RELEV = IDCDD_SE_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_COST, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_COST = IDCDD_SE_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_DISCcombo, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_DISCcombo = IDCDD_SE_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDCdaily_DD_RELEV'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCdaily_DD_RELEV / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDCdaily_DD_COST'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCdaily_DD_COST / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDCdaily_DISCCOMBO'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCdaily_DISCCOMBO / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 






Is self-(in)security/self-esteem associated with subjective experience of stress (SES)? 
Table 4.6 Level 1 Level 2 
Model #1 Today’s SESij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Model #2 Today’s SESij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + β2j(Today’s NA)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
Model #3 Today’s SESij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Model #4 Today’s SESij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + β2j(Today’s NA)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
Model #5 Today’s SESij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + β2j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + 
rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
Model #6 Today’s SESij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + β2j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + 
β3j(Today’s NA)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
β3j = γ30 
 
title 'DD_STRS_EvOv, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_STRS_EvOv = IDCDD_SS_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID; 
Run; 
 
title 'DD_STRS_EvOv, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg IDCDD_NA_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_STRS_EvOv = IDCDD_SS_avg IDCDD_NA_avg / solution DDFM= 
SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_STRS_EvOv, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_STRS_EvOv = IDCDD_SE_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 







title 'DD_STRS_EvOv, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avg IDCDD_NA_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_STRS_EvOv = IDCDD_SE_avg IDCDD_NA_avg / solution DDFM= 
SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID; 
Run; 
 
title 'DD_STRS_EvOv, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg IDCDD_SE_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_STRS_EvOv = IDCDD_SS_avg IDCDD_SE_avg / solution DDFM= 
SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_STRS_EvOv, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg IDCDD_SE_avg IDCDD_NA_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_STRS_EvOv = IDCDD_SS_avg IDCDD_SE_avg IDCDD_NA_avg / solution DDFM= 
SATTERTHWAITE; 







Is self-(in)security/self-esteem associated with unpleasant repetitive thinking even after 
accounting for subjective experience of stress (SES)? 
Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + β2j(Today’s SES)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + β2j(Today’s SES)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg IDCdaily_STRS_EvOv'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SS_avg IDCdaily_STRS_EvOv / solution DDFM= 
SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avg IDCdaily_STRS_EvOv'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SE_avg IDCdaily_STRS_EvOv / solution DDFM= 
SATTERTHWAITE; 







Is self-(in)security/self-esteem associated with alcohol use? 
… with the number of drinks consumed? 
Level 1 Level 2 
Today’s Alcohol useij 
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s Drinks consumedij 
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-(in)security)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s Alcohol useij 
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
Today’s Drinks consumedij 
= β0j + β1j(Today’s Self-esteem)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
 
title 'DD_drinkYESNO, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_drinkYESNO = IDCDD_SS_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_DRINK_numb, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_DRINK_numb = IDCDD_SS_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID; 
Run; 
 
title 'DD_drinkYESNO, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_drinkYESNO = IDCDD_SE_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID;  
Run; 
 
title 'DD_DRINK_numb, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avg'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_DRINK_numb = IDCDD_SE_avg / solution DDFM= SATTERTHWAITE; 







Is yesterday’s self-(in)security/self-esteem associated with changes in today’s unpleasant 
repetitive thinking? 
Level 1 Level 2 
Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Yesterday’s Self-(in)security)ij + β2j(Yesterday’s URT)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
Today’s URTij  
= β0j + β1j(Yesterday’s Self-esteem)ij + β2j(Yesterday’s URT)ij + rij 
β0j = γ00 + µ0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDCDD_SS_avgprev DD_URT_avgprev'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SS_avgprev DD_URT_avgprev / solution DDFM= 
SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID; 
Run; 
 
title 'DD_URT_avg, predictor: IDCDD_SE_avgprev DD_URT_avgprev'; 
proc mixed ic Data=MdtrLib.CONCERNSdata6 Method=ML covtest noclprint; 
Class PID; 
Model DD_URT_avg = IDCDD_SE_avgprev DD_URT_avgprev / solution DDFM= 
SATTERTHWAITE; 
Random Intercept / solution type=un subject=PID; 
Run; 
 
